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Rom: RLUIPA and Prisoner's Rights: Vindicating Liberty of Conscience

RLUIPA AND PRISONER’S RIGHTS:
VINDICATING LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE
FOR THE CONDEMNED BY TARGETING A
STATE’S BOTTOM LINE
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine shortly after your incarceration in South Greenwich State
Prison your outlook on life is transformed by your conversion to Islam.1
Every day for fifteen years in prison, you faithfully follow the tenets of
your faith, and you feel that this is your only connection to the world
that exists beyond your forbidding prison walls. During a daily prison
inspection, you find yourself deep in prayer and are slow to comply with
one of the prison official’s mandates to vacate your cell. Upon
inspection, prison officials discover your Koran, prayer rug, and prayer
beads, which are confiscated and subsequently destroyed for security
reasons.2 Without the ability to utilize items integral to the practice of
your faith, you experience severe depression and spend forty-five days
in the prison’s psychiatric unit.3 Prison officials claim you lacked
property papers for the prayer rug, misused your prayer beads by
wearing them on your neck, and created a security risk with your Koran
by using a piece of tape to keep its cover attached.4 You know the real
reason they confiscated your belongings was to punish you for
possessing Muslim religious items and moving too slowly during the cell
check.5
After pleading with prison officials to return your items to no avail,
you look to the courts to vindicate your free exercise rights. The court
denies the prison officials’ motion to dismiss your claim and is
concerned with South Greenwich’s cavalier attitude toward a Muslim’s
rights to possess articles of faith.6 Prison administrators consult with
1
This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts from Shaw v. Norman, No. 6:07cv44,
2008 WL 5272601 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2008). The action subject to the complaint took place at
the Beto Unit of the Texas prison system. Id. at *1.
2
Id. The prison warden testified that inmates were normally permitted to have a copy
of the Koran and a prayer rug. Id.
3
Id. Shaw could not say his prayers without his prayer rug or beads, nor could he
study the Koran. Id. at *13.
4
Id. at *6–7. In addition, the prison officials argued the confiscation of the religious
articles was nothing more than “a simple state court claim for conversion” and the federal
district court did not have jurisdiction to hear Shaw’s claim. Id. at *6,*8.
5
Id. at *1. Because he had been incarcerated for over fifteen years, Shaw accumulated a
large amount of property in his cell. Id. The facts indicated the prison officials took other
forms of property than his religious articles. Id.
6
Id. at *8–*14. The court noted that the prison officials failed to show how a Koran with
a piece of tape on its cover was altered property and how it was a security risk. Id. at *7.
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their attorneys and determine that transferring you to another state
facility will extinguish your claim. Still reeling from your latest victory,
you greet the news of the transfer with optimism and look forward to a
favorable outcome in the pending litigation. Upon your return to court,
however, the judge informs you that your claim must be dismissed as
South Greenwich prison officials cannot harm you where you are going.
You implore the judge to reconsider, as the specter of future persecution
in your new facility looms overhead. You start to believe that the law
cannot help you and that there is no way to punish the officials for
blatant violations of the Constitution.
Sadly, for many prisoners the scenario just described is a cruel
reality they must live with every day. In 2000, dissatisfied with
contemporary efforts to protect the religious liberties of prisoners,
Senators Orrin Hatch and Ted Kennedy urged their fellow Senators to
support the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA” or “the Act”).7 In a joint statement they declared: It is well
known that prisoners often file frivolous claims; it is less well known that
prison officials sometimes impose frivolous or arbitrary rules. Whether
from indifference, ignorance, bigotry, or lack of resources, some
institutions restrict religious liberty in egregious and unnecessary
ways.”8 While “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison
inmates from the protections of the Constitution[,]” the free exercise
rights of prisoners may be restricted when prison officials regulate under
the auspices of advancing a legitimate penological interest.9
RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing a substantial
burden on a prisoner’s religious exercise unless that burden is in
furtherance of a compelling interest.10 When a RLUIPA violation occurs,
prisoners can bring suit against the government for injunctive or

They also did not show a rational, valid connection between prison regulation and the
security risks of wearing prayer beads around the neck. Id. Moreover, the Court found it
inappropriate to take Shaw’s prayer rug from him for not having property papers when it
was established that he could keep it in his cell. Id.
7
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2006).
8
146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy). Religiously associated claims in relation to other prisoner claims are relatively
few and, on average, are more meritorious than other prisoner claims. Id.
9
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 87 (1987). See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723
(2005) (noting that Congress intended for the judiciary to give “due deference to the
experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary
regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with
consideration of costs and limited resources.” (quoting 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July
27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy))).
10
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). RLUIPA also applies to land use, but land use is not the
subject of this Note. See id. § 2000cc(a).
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declaratory relief, but the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits are split on whether RLUIPA allows prisoners to seek
monetary relief despite the states’ traditional immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment.11 This Note argues that in its present form,
RLUIPA allows prisoners to sue government officials in their official
capacity and for monetary relief.12
First, Part II provides the history and events surrounding RLUIPA’s
enactment, chronicles the scope of the constitutional powers Congress
relied on to enact RLUIPA, and discusses courts’ differing interpretations
concerning the availability of damages.13 Next, Part III analyzes whether
RLUIPA in its present form allows prisoners to sue states for monetary
relief.14 Finally, Part IV argues that key provisions of RLUIPA can be
interpreted broadly to enable prisoners to sue states for monetary relief.15
II. BACKGROUND
Incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, the First
Amendment prevents state governmental inference with individuals’
right to freely exercise their religion.16 Since 1990, however, the
Id. § 2000cc-2(a). RLUIPA authorizes a cause of action for “appropriate relief” against
the government. Id. See infra Part II.C (discussing the circuit split).
12
See infra Part IV.A (proposing model judicial interpretation).
13
See infra Part.II.A (detailing the important Supreme Court Cases and relevant
legislative history before Congress passed RLUIPA); Part II.B (explaining why Congress
used its spending and commerce power to enact RLUIPA); Part II.B.1 (explaining the
validity of RLUIPA under the Spending Clause); Part II.B.2 (providing the relevant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and exploring how it applies to RLUIPA); Part II.C
(introducing the important distinctions between official and individual capacity claims);
Part II.C.1 (explaining why a majority of courts do not award damages in official capacity
claims under the Spending Clause); Part II.C.2 (discussing the scant case law concerning
RLUIPA and damages in individual capacity claims under the Commerce Clause).
14
See infra Part III.A.1 (explaining why the statutory text of RLUIPA serves as a textual
waiver to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Part III.A.2 (finding the catch-all provision of
the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act (“CRREA”) fails to be a textual waiver); Part
III.B (finding that damages are available for individual capacity claims under the
Commerce Clause, but in very limited circumstances); Part III.C (arguing that damages
should be available to prisoners).
15
See infra Part IV (explaining that RLUIPA’s terms are required to be interpreted
broadly and discussing how Congress can establish a comprehensive scheme).
16
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The religion clause of the First Amendment states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.” Id. See U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .”); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause is incorporated
though the Fourteenth Amendment). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 499–507 (3rd ed. 2006) (discussing the incorporation
doctrine).
11
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protection guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause has not been to
Congress’s liking.17 In 2000, after some trial and error, RLUIPA became
Congress’s newest attempt to protect religious rights.18 First, Part II.A
briefly explores the origins of RLUIPA by outlining Congress’s struggle
to restore strict scrutiny review in free exercise claims and the
subsequent passing of RLUIPA.19 Part II.A surveys the legal analysis of
RLUIPA as valid Spending or Commerce Clause legislation and the
availability of monetary relief.20 Next, Part II.B examines RLUIPA’s
constitutionality under Congress’s Article I powers.21 Finally, Part II.C
discusses the availability of monetary damages against state officials in
both official and individual capacities.22
A. Restoring Strict Scrutiny Review in Free Exercise Claims
The history of RLUIPA began in 1990, a decade before its passage,
when the Supreme Court upheld an Oregon law prohibiting the
consumption of peyote.23 In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court
rejected nearly thirty years of precedent by finding that the use of strict
scrutiny as the standard of review to neutral laws of general applicability
in First Amendment religious challenges was no longer appropriate.24 In
17
See Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Free Exercise of Religion After Smith and Boerne:
Charting a Middle Course, 68 MISS. L.J. 105, 106 (1998) (“To put it mildly, Congress was not
pleased with [Employment Division v.] Smith.”). See also infra Part II.A (discussing Smith).
18
146 CONG. REC. S6687 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (mentioning
that Congress spent three years debating RLUIPA).
19
See infra Part II.A.
20
See infra Part II.B.
21
See id. (discussing RLUIPA as valid Spending and Commerce Clause legislation).
22
See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing damages in official capacity claims and discussing
whether RLUIPA clearly intended acceptance of federal funds as a waiver of a state’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity to monetary damages); Part II.C.2 (discussing damages in
individual capacity claims under the Commerce Clause).
23
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). The Oregon law prohibited the
possession of any controlled substance, which included peyote, a hallucinogenic drug. Id.
at 874. The plaintiffs ingested peyote for sacramental purposes of the Native American
Church. Id. Ironically, a private drug rehabilitation organization subsequently fired them.
Id. The State of Oregon denied them unemployment compensation because their discharge
related to misconduct. Id. The Plaintiffs challenged the denial of benefits, claiming the
controlled substance law violated the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
24
Id. at 884–85. “[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the [law]
but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the
First Amendment has not been offended.” Id. at 878. The Court also noted that “the right
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” Id. at 879 (internal quotations
omitted). The Smith Court overturned Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), which held
that any burden on the freedom to exercise religion must be justified by a compelling
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1993, Congress responded to Smith by using its Section Five power under
the Fourteenth Amendment to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (“RFRA”) to restore the strict scrutiny standard of review in all free
exercise claims.25 The religious protections of RFRA did not last long, as
the Supreme Court struck down RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores in 1997.26
According to the Court, Congress has the power to enforce rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment, but the means adopted must be
proportionate and congruent to the injury.27 Requiring strict scrutiny
review for neutral laws of general applicability failed the proportionate
governmental interest, including laws of general applicability. Id. at 873, 885 (calling the
compelling government interest requirement “benign”). In Sherbert, the Court invalidated
a law that denied unemployment benefits to those who quit or were fired from their jobs
for religious reasons. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409. See also Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline
of the Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty, 70 NEB. L. REV. 651, 673 (1991) (calling the
Court’s holding in Smith “very surprising and wholly unexpected” considering recent
Supreme Court decisions). Four years earlier, Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority
opinion in Smith, joined the Court in its strong reaffirmation of strict scrutiny review. Id. at
674 n.143 (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1987)).
25
S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 13–14 (1993); H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 9 (1993). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (2006). The statute expressly states the purpose of RFRA was to overturn Smith
and restore the application of Sherbert in all free exercise of religion claims. Id. See also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 1252–54 (summarizing the cases in which the Court applied
strict scrutiny review before Smith). After Sherbert, however, the Court only invalidated
laws for violating free exercise in two areas: those situations similar to Sherbert that denied
benefits to those who quit their jobs for religious reasons and to enforce compulsory
schooling to the Amish. Id. See also Choper, supra note 24, at 684–85 (arguing religious
liberty would suffer greatly in lower federal and state courts). Although the Supreme
Court did not invalidate many laws that burdened religious exercise, lower federal and
state courts invalidated many laws that burdened religious exercise. Id.
26
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). The St. Peter Catholic Church
applied for a building permit to expand its church to meet the demand of a growing
congregation, but the local zoning authority ruled the church was a historical landmark
and prohibited the construction. Id. at 512. Subsequently, the church sued the city for
violating RFRA. Id. The city responded that RFRA was unconstitutional. Id. See also Sara
Smolik, Note, The Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA: Was it a Waste?, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 723, 728–30 (2004) (summarizing the facts and holding of City of Boerne).
27
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. Congress can only prevent or remedy violations of
rights recognized by the Court under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 519–20. See
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 295–300 (providing arguments for whether City of
Boerne is a desirable interpretation of Congress’s Section Five powers). The decision is seen
as the Court protecting its role as the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution. See id. at 298.
Yet, criticism is warranted for denying Congress the ability to expand the scope of rights.
Id. The Ninth Amendment invites government to expand rights by stating that “[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.” Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IX). Determining
the proper interpretation of Section Five is complicated, thus requiring analysis of the
constitutional text, the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment framers, and basic policy
questions surrounding the relationship of government with the separation of powers,
federalism, and individual rights. Id. at 299.
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and congruent standard, thereby exceeding Congress’s Section Five
power.28
Determined to protect free exercise rights, Congress moved quickly
after City of Boerne by passing RLUIPA in 2000 to protect the
constitutional right of institutionalized persons to worship without
unnecessary governmental interference.29 RLUIPA, compared to RFRA,
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533–36. RFRA, by requiring strict scrutiny for all free
exercise challenges, prohibited much activity that would be constitutional, and thus, it was
not proportionate and congruent. Id. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 229–30
(explaining that according to Section Five, Congress cannot expand or create new rights,
but must only provide remedies for those rights recognized by the courts). See also
Brunskill v. Boyd, 141 F. App’x 771, 775 (11th Cir. 2005) (“RFRA does not apply to state
regulations or state actors”); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156,
167 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[W]ithout doubt the portion [of RFRA] applicable to the federal
government . . . survived the Supreme Court’s decision striking down the statute as
applied to the States.” (alteration in original) (quoting Henderson v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d
1072, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2001))). Even though RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to the
states, it still applies to the federal government. Brunskill, 141 F. App’x at 775; Ashcroft, 333
F.3d at 167.
29
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc; 146 CONG. REC. S6688 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy) (“[I]nstitutionalized persons are often unreasonably denied the opportunity
to practice their religion, even when their observance would not undermine discipline,
order, or safety in the facilities.”); 146 CONG. REC. H7191 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement
of Rep. Canady) (explaining that considering their incarceration, institutionalized persons
are particularly vulnerable to government regulation curtailing their ability to worship).
See also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720–21 (2005) (explaining that institutionalized
persons are those in state-run “mental hospitals, prisons, and the like—in which the
government exerts a degree of control unparalleled in civilian society”). See generally
Enrique Armijo, Belief Behind Bars: Religious Freedom in Prison, RLUIPA, and the
Establishment Clause, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 297, 301 (2005).
Moreover, a prisoner’s First Amendment rights take on an added importance considering
that:
The prison administrator’s power to circumscribe or even revoke the
prisoner’s right to read a book, write a letter, or attend a religious
meeting, as well as the total uniformity of the prison atmosphere, can
make rights that are otherwise entrenched in everyday life more
meaningful to a prisoner whose capacity to exercise his constitutional
rights is far more tenuous.
Id. See also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 721 n.10 (recognizing the importance of religion in prisoner
rehabilitation); 146 CONG. REC. S6689 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
In addition to being a core constitutional right, worship can serve as an integral part of the
rehabilitation process in correctional facilities. 146 CONG. REC. S6689 (daily ed. July 13,
2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that
First Amendment claims in the prison context must be reasonably related to the
penological interests and that courts should be conscious of the great degree of judicial
deference given to prison officials).
For a discussion about how Congress only lightly debated judicial deference and the
implications on state sovereignty while considering to enact RLUIPA, see Marci A.
Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 341 (2003) (noting that Congress discussed
28
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is narrower in scope, offering religious protection only to
institutionalized persons and in land use, while RFRA applied to all free
exercise claims.30 Under RLUIPA, the government cannot impose a
“substantial burden” on an institutionalized person’s right to free
exercise unless the imposition of that burden furthers a compelling
government interest and is done by the least restrictive means.31 When a

RLUIPA only in the prison context, but courts have nonetheless applied it to all
institutionalized persons). See also 146 CONG. REC. S7991 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 2000) (statement
of Sen. Thurmond). Only Senator Strom Thurmond raised potential concerns that RLUIPA
was inconsistent with federalism principles and could potentially lessen judicial deference
to prison officials. Id. See generally Strutton v. Meade, No. 4:05CV02022 ERW, 2008 WL
4534015 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2008) (dismissing a RLUIPA claim against a sexual offender
treatment center); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005)
(presenting a RLUIPA claim brought on behalf of Terry Schiavo while she was
incapacitated and only kept alive by life support); Jennifer D. Larson, Note, RLUIPA,
Distress, and Damages, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1443, 1451 n.63 (2007) (noting that only one
published opinion, In re L.A., 912 A.2d 977 (Vt. 2006), was brought on behalf of a person in
a mental institution).
30
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (stating that RLUIPA applies to institutionalized persons),
with id. § 2000bb(b)(1) (stating the purpose of RFRA is to apply to all free exercise claims).
See 146 CONG. REC. S7778 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy). Initially the House proposed much more sweeping legislation dubbed the
Religious Liberty Protection Act (“RLPA”), but it stalled in the Senate because of
constitutional fears. Id. RLPA was essentially the same as RFRA, but Congress used its
authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses as opposed to its Section Five power.
Id. (citing Religious Liberty Protection Act, H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(1)–(2) (1999)).
RLPA raised concerns, however, that it would supersede certain civil rights, namely those
related to employment and housing. Id. In addition, serious questions surrounded
whether RLPA was valid under Congress’s spending or commerce power considering
RLPA’s broad application. Id. See also Jennifer Dorton, Note, The Religious Liberty Protection
Act: The Validity of Using Congress Commerce and Spending Powers to Protect Religion, 48
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 389, 394 (2000) (arguing that RLPA could have been in danger of being
coercive because it applied to any program that received federal assistance) (emphasis
added); Michael Paisner, Note, Boerne Supremacy: Congressional Responses to City of Boerne
v. Flores and the Scope of Congress’s Article I Powers, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 545 (2005)
(stating that RLUIPA, by not extending as far as RFRA and RLPA, was a political
compromise to appease those concerned with the civil rights implications of RLPA while
avoiding the constitutional flaws of RFRA.). Dorton, supra, at 395–96. Congress likely
exceeded its commerce power by not limiting the application of RLPA to actions that
substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. See generally infra Part II.B. (discussing the
factors necessary for valid Spending and Commerce Clause legislation).
31
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The relevant provision of institutionalized persons reads:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined
in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden on that person—(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
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violation occurs, the plaintiff may obtain “appropriate relief” from the
government.32 The statutory language of RLUIPA is to be “construed in
favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent
permitted by [its] terms . . . and the Constitution.”33 Before RLUIPA can
protect the religious rights of institutionalized persons, however, it must
first be a valid constitutional act of Congress.34

Id. The burden on the government under RLUIPA is the exact same burden RFRA
demands of the federal government. Compare id., with id. § 2000bb-1(b). See generally Aaron
K. Block, Note, When Money is Tight, is Strict Scrutiny Loose?: Cost Sensitivity as a Compelling
Governmental Interest Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 14
TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 237 (2009) (arguing that avoiding increased cost to accommodate
religious practice should not qualify as a compelling government interest); Scott Budzenksi,
Comment, Tug of War: The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Circuits—The Fifth Circuit’s
Input on the Struggle to Define a Prisoner’s Right to Religious Freedom in Adkins v. Kaspar, 80
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1335 (2006) (noting that the circuits are split as to the exact standard of
“substantial burden” in RLUIPA claims, and the Supreme Court has denied resolving the
issue).
32
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). See 146 CONG. REC. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement
of Rep. Canady). The report prepared by the House Committee on the Judiciary said:
[RLUIPA’s judicial relief] tracks RFRA, creating a private cause of
action for damages, injunction, and declaratory judgment, and a
defense to liability.
These claims and defenses lie against a
government, but the Act does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of states. In the case of violation by a state, the Act must be
enforced by suits against state officials or employees.
Id. See also infra Part II.C.1 (discussing whether “appropriate relief” is clear enough
language to place a state on notice to subject it to claims of monetary damages by accepting
federal funds).
33
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g). See also Walls v. Schriro, No. CV 05-2259-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL
2463671, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 16, 2008) (stating that RLUIPA is construed broadly in favor of
prisoners); Starr v. Cox, No. 05-cv-368-JD, 2008 WL 1914286, at *7 (D.N.H. Apr. 28, 2008)
(noting the phrase “religious exercise” is to be construed liberally).
34
See infra Part II.B (discussing Congress’s authority to pass RLUIPA). See also Cutter,
544 U.S. at 720–23. In Cutter, the Supreme Court reviewed RLUIPA under the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, finding it constitutional; however the Court
did not address the constitutionality of RLUIPA as a valid exercise of Congress’s Spending
or Commerce Clause authority. Id. The Court found RLUIPA to be compatible with the
Establishment Clause because it alleviates government-created burdens on prisoners’ rights
to practice religion, and it does not differentiate between certain religions. Id. Moreover,
RLUIPA does not place accommodating prisoners’ religious beliefs over the need to
maintain safety and order. Id. at 722–23. See also Michael Keegan, The Supreme Court’s
“Prisoner Dilemma:” How Johnson, RLUIPA, and Cutter Re-Defined Inmate Constitutional
Claims, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 279, 306–12 (2007) (discussing the circuit split resolved by the Cutter
decision); Morgan F. Johnson, Comment, Heaven Help Us: The Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act’s Prisoners Provisions in the Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s
Decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 585, 599–601 (2006)
(arguing that the Court’s free exercise analysis under RLUIPA will only lead to excessive
litigation and threats to institutional order).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/8

Rom: RLUIPA and Prisoner's Rights: Vindicating Liberty of Conscience

2009]

RLUIPA and Prisoner’s Rights

291

B. Congressional Authority to Enact RLUIPA
Mindful of the constitutional shortcomings of RFRA, Congress used
two Article I powers, the Spending35 and Commerce36 Clauses, to enact
RLUIPA.37 The religious liberty provisions of RLUIPA apply when a
“substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives
Federal financial assistance” or when “the substantial burden affects, or
removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign
nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes.”38 All circuits
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States.” Id. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–11 (1987)
(outlining the requirements for valid spending clause legislation). The Dole requirements
are: (1) the exercise of spending power must be done for the general welfare of the people;
(2) the terms and conditions must be unambiguously stated; (3) the conditions must have
some relationship to the federal spending; (4) the conditions cannot violate another
constitutional provision; and (5) the conditions offered by Congress cannot be so coercive
as to transform pressure into compulsion. Id.
36
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 1, 3. “The Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes[.]” Id. See also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608–09 (2000). Under this
power Congress may regulate three categories:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce, . . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce.
Id. at 609 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995)) (citations and
quotations omitted). Only the final category is relevant to RLUIPA. Id.; Heather Guidry,
Comment, If at First You Don’t Succeed . . . : Can the Commerce Clause and Spending Clause
Support Congress’s Latest Attempt at Religious Freedom Legislation?, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 419, 434
(2001) (stating that “the activity regulated is not itself inherently commercial, but the
statute’s provisions limit it to regulation of specific policies that have a commercial effect”).
37
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b) (stating that RLUIPA applies to any program that receives
Federal financial assistance or if the substantial burden would affect commerce among the
States, with foreign nations, or with Indian tribes).
38
Id. The first provision invokes the Spending Clause while the second invokes the
Commerce Clause. Id. “[P]rogram or activity” is defined as “all of the operations of . . . a
department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local
government.” Id. § 2000d-4a(1)(A). Cutter, 544 U.S. at 716 n.4. Every state accepts federal
funding for its prisons, thus every state is subject to RLUIPA. Id. See also Ish Yerushalayim
v. U.S. Dep’t of Corr., 374 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that RLUIPA cannot be
enforced against the federal government because RLUIPA “does not create a cause of
action against the federal government or its correctional facilities”); Wiley v. Glover, No.
1:05-cv-1156-MEF, 2009 WL 67657, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 9, 2009) (dismissing a prisoner’s
RLUIPA claim because he did not invoke the statute in his complaint or amended
35
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that analyzed RLUIPA under the Spending Clause found it valid.39 As a
result, most courts chose not to review RLUIPA’s Commerce Clause
validity,40 and only one court fully analyzed RLUIPA under the
Commerce Clause.41
When the regulated activity is not an instrument of commerce or
related to the channels of commerce, four factors are used to decide
whether the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce:
(1) is the activity at which the statute is directed commercial or economic

complaint). In Wiley, the prisoner challenged the defendant’s conduct under RFRA. Id. at
*1 n.1. The court ruled that prison officials were state actors and, even if the complaint was
construed to include RFRA, the prisoner had no basis for relief. Id. at *1.
39
Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 124 (4th Cir. 2006); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d
579, 584–90 (6th Cir. 2005); Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1305–09 (11th Cir. 2004);
Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 607–11 (7th Cir. 2003); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314
F.3d 1062, 1066–70 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Keegan, supra note 34, at 317–324 (supporting
RLUIPA as valid under the Spending Clause); Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four:
Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 501, 590–98 (2005) (same). But see Cutter, 544 U.S. at 727 n.2 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (stating that RLUIPA may well exceed Congress’s authority under the
Spending or Commerce Clause); Benjamin D. Cramer, Comment, Can Congress Buy
RLUIPA’s Way to Constitutional Salvation?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1073, 1085–86 (2005)
(arguing that RLUIPA would fail the Dole test because the conditions are not sufficiently
related to spending and it could be coercive).
40
See Madison, 474 F.3d at 126 n.1 (recognizing that by holding RLUIPA a valid exercise
of Congress’s spending power, no need existed to decide whether Congress exceeded its
commerce power); Benning, 391 F.3d at 1304 (finding the court did not need to resolve both
a Spending Clause and Commerce Clause challenge to legislation “so long as Congress
validly exercised either source of authority”); Charles, 348 F.3d at 609 (stating that the court
does not need to involve itself with the Commerce Clause); Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1068
n.2 (finding RLUIPA valid under the Spending Clause and not deciding the issue under the
Commerce Clause). See also Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 839 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(surpassing Commerce Clause analysis in favor of the Spending Clause due to the ensuing
difficulty). “[T]he Commerce Clause issues are the more difficult, requiring substantial
construction of the statutory language and raising serious questions about the relationship
between the internal operation of state prisons and interstate commerce.” Id. See generally
Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 354 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing the use
of the jurisdictional element that allows for a case-by-case analysis to determine if the
activity in question affects interstate commerce). For the land use provision of RLUIPA, the
Second Circuit concluded it was a valid exercise of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. Id. at 354.
41
Daker v. Ferrero, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1342–47 (N.D. Ga. 2007). See Cutter, 423 F.3d at
582. According to the Sixth Circuit, if the only jurisdictional basis for RLUIPA is the
Commerce Clause, prison officials would have the affirmative defense that the substantial
burden imposed did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. See also Lara
A. Berwanger, Note, White Knight?: Can the Commerce Clause Save the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2355, 2391–95 (2004) (noting that the
relation of the Commerce Clause to the land use portion of RLUIPA has attracted more
attention).
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in nature?;42 (2) does the statute have a jurisdictional element limiting
applicability to only situations when it substantially affects interstate
commerce?;43 (3) what are the congressional findings regarding the
effects of the prohibited activity on interstate commerce?;44 and (4) is the
link between the prohibited conduct and a substantial effect on interstate
commerce attenuated?45
42
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551, 558–60 (1995) (holding that the activities
regulated by the Gun Free School Zones Act (“GFSZA”) were not commercial and did not
substantially affect interstate commerce). The GFSZA did not regulate commerce or any
other sort of economic enterprise as “possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no
sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect
any sort of interstate commerce.” Id. at 567. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
610–17 (2000) (holding that criminal, non-economic conduct cannot substantially affect
interstate commerce through its aggregate effect). The Court struck down the civil remedy
provision in the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”). Id. at 627. Gender-motivated
crime certainly had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, but the activity regulated
was purely criminal. Id. at 615. To allow Congress to regulate non-economic activity based
on its aggregate affect would essentially allow Congress to regulate every violent crime. Id.
See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 117–18, 129 (1942) (holding that Congress can
regulate all members of a class of activities economic in nature that substantially affects
interstate commerce, even those members who have a trivial effect). The Court in Wickard
considered the Agricultural Adjustment Act (“AAA”) that regulated personal wheat
production. Id.
43
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (explaining that a jurisdictional element could have saved the
GFSZA). Jurisdictional elements limit application only to situations that have a connection
or effect on interstate commerce. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1218
(11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]here a jurisdictional element is required, a meaningful one, rather
than a pretextual incantation evoking the phantasm of commerce, must be offered.”)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859
(2000) (unanimously finding that a federal statute concerning arson that included a
jurisdictional hook applied only in situations when the arson substantially affected
interstate commerce); United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 472–73 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting
an absolute rule that a jurisdictional element preserves constitutionality).
44
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561–62. In situations where Congress does not establish a
jurisdictional element, the Court is to look to congressional findings for a potential link
between the regulated action and interstate activity. Id. When the Lopez Court looked, it
found nothing. Id. at 562. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. Like the GFSZA, VAWA had no
jurisdictional element, but unlike the situation in Lopez, Congress made numerous findings
pertaining to the adverse effects on interstate commerce by gender-motivated violence. Id.
In Morrison, the Court appeared to place emphasis on the first and fourth factors because
congressional findings alone were not enough to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation. Id. at 611–13.
45
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. The Court had no interest “to pile inference upon inference” to
find a substantial effect. Id. See United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 629 (10th Cir. 2006)
(finding that possession of body armor was more attenuated than the circumstance in Lopez
because it was not a threatening act affecting commerce, but was used in self-defense).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. The Lopez Court continued, “[a]dmittedly, some of our prior cases
have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action.” Id.
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (stating that
Congress need only “a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels
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The Daker court examined whether RLUIPA regulated an activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce and answered the first
factor in the negative, determining that the activity was non-economic
and thus its aggregate effect on interstate commerce could not be
considered.46 The court reasoned that RLUIPA protected free exercise of
religion by prohibiting unjustifiable interference with the religious
practice of institutionalized persons, and did not regulate economic
activity.47 Even with a jurisdictional hook, the Daker court found the
affected commerce”). See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614. Congressional findings is one
method to find a rational basis, but the Morrison Court seemingly ended such practice by
stating that “[w]hether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come
under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather
than a legislative question.” Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273 (Black, J.,
concurring) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted)). See generally Arthur B.
Mark III, Currents in Commerce Clause Scholarship Since Lopez: A Survey, 32 CAP. U. L. REV.
671 (2004) (detailing the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence and scholarship
since Lopez); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Implications of the New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence:
An Evolutionary or Revolutionary Court?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 795 (2003) (debating whether the
curtailing of congressional power under the Commerce Clause is desirable or not and the
larger implications concerning federalism by doing so).
46
Daker, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1345. See United States v. Guzman, 582 F. Supp. 2d 305, 315
(N.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA")
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause); Karen S. Schuller, Note, North Carolina v.
Bryant: Paving the Way for a Comprehensive National Sex Offender Registry, 30 N.C. CENT. L.
REV. 75, 93–96 (2007) (discussing the requirements of SORNA and praising it for
establishing a uniform, comprehensive requirement for sex offenders to register). SORNA,
42 U.S.C. § 16913 (2006), creates a federal duty for a registered sex offender to update
information about where the offender resides, is employed, and is a student. Schuller,
supra, at 93. An offender who travels in interstate commerce and knowingly fails to update
the registry can face ten years in prison. Id. at 95; Guzman, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 312. In
finding SORNA unconstitutional, the Guzman court first noted that it did not regulate
activity that was economic in nature nor could the duty to register be construed as a
commercial activity as its stated purpose was to “protect the public from sex offenders and
offenders against children.” Id. at 312 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006). In addition,
SORNA lacked any jurisdictional hook and did not provide any congressional findings
about the affect of sex offender registration on interstate commerce. Id. Lastly, like Lopez,
the criminal activity had too tenuous a connection to substantially affect interstate
commerce. Id. at 312. See United States v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 2d 912, 920 (N.D. Iowa
2008) (finding SORNA unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because unlike
Section 2250(a), SORNA applies to sex offenders that cross and never cross state lines);
United States v. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (holding that the
jurisdictional hook was insufficient because it failed to establish a nexus between the crime
and interstate commerce). But see United States v. Hinen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 747, 757–58 (W.D.
Va. 2007) (reading Section 2250(a) to act as a jurisdictional hook to limit the applicability of
SORNA to only those sex offenders who crossed state lines, and thus was constitutional).
47
Daker, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1345. By its terms, RLUIPA, according to the court, had
nothing to do with commerce. Id. Interestingly, the court offered hypothetical versions of
RLUIPA that would constitute a regulation of economic activity:
[A]n affirmative obligation imposed by RLUIPA, such as requiring
prison officials to make an accommodation to prisoners with religious
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conduct regulated by RLUIPA did not have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce and suggested its effect would be attenuated.48 The
dietary requests, could be potentially viewed as compelling an
“economic” activity—i.e., the purchasing of specialty foods. Or, . . . a
restriction on the mailing of a religious publication may arguably be
characterized as “economic,” by restricting or giving effect to an
interstate transaction in religious material.
Id. at 1345 n.10. The court noted that its focus was on the activity directly regulated by the
statute and that it should not decide the matter by hypothesizing certain situations. Id. See
Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 125–26 (5th Cir. 2007). The financial impact of dietary
requests can be quite substantial, such that prisons officials have a substantial interest in
denying them in order to control costs because no alternative or lesser means exist to keep
budgets low. Id. See also Adams v. Mosley, No. 2:05cv352-MHT, 2008 WL 4369246, at *10–
12 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 25, 2008) (Native American required the smoking of tobacco); Jones v.
Rieben, No. 2:04cv1029-MHT, 2008 WL 4080360, at *6–7 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 2, 2008)
(requesting a religious feast); Johnson v. Martin, 223 F. Supp. 2d 820, 829 (W.D. Mich. 2002)
(holding that RLUIPA regulated the free exercise of religion, which was objectively an
interstate activity).
Many RLUIPA claims have commercial undertones, while the Johnson court further
noted the economic impact of religion:
[F]ree exercise of religion affects interstate commerce in a multitude of
ways including: use of the airwaves to advertise various religions and
to seek charitable donations for domestic and international concerns;
use of the interstate highway system for traveling choirs and
missionary groups; and, use of the mail system to buy and sell
ceremonial items and religious literature.
Johnson, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 829. The Johnson court relied on the principle that religious
organizations engage in and affect interstate commerce.
Id. (citing Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 584–86 (1997) (holding that
non-profit agencies were major participants in interstate markets and were significant
contributors)). But see Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898, 904 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding the
prison’s grooming policy that forced inmates to cut their hair to a certain length for safety
purposes); Marr v. Foy, No. 1:07-cv-908, 2008 WL 5111849, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2008)
(rejecting prisoner’s request to have his Kosher diet exclusively prepared in another room);
Muhammad v. Crosby, No. 4:05cv193-WS, 2008 WL 2229746, at *15–16 (N.D. Fla. May 29,
2008) (rejecting/allowing prisoner’s requests for Islamic clothing and a Qibla compass and
granting/denying permission to un-tuck his shirt from his pants and take showers outside
of the cell).
48
Daker, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1346–47. The court rejected any rational basis for finding that
the behavior regulated by RLUIPA alone could substantially affect interstate commerce
because of the nature of the regulated activity. Id. at 1346–48. See Mayweathers v.
Terhune, No. CIVS961582LKKGGHP, 2001 WL 804140, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2001) (“The
jurisdictional element . . . thereby ensures that Congress’ Commerce Clause power is only
exercised in those cases where interstate commerce is directly affected by the prison
regulation at issue.”). But see generally Guidry, supra note 36, at 425–49 (arguing that
RLUIPA regulates non-economic activity, but the jurisdictional hook limits its scope to
economic-affecting activity). According to Guidry, situations concerning requests for
religious diet, religious articles, and religious literature will be able to employ the
aggregate effects test. Id. at 441–46. However, requests for growth of hair and beards will
not, and religious ceremonies and interstate travel by family members are gray areas. Id. at
446–49.
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Daker court made no mention of congressional findings because no
specific findings existed.49 Next, the court determined RLUIPA was not
part of a larger, comprehensive market.50 Aside from the Commerce
49
See 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and
Sen. Kennedy). Congress never made specific findings, but envisioned the jurisdictional
hook to apply in situations when the burden prevents economic transactions in commerce,
such as construction projects, purchase or rental of a building, or an interstate shipment of
religious goods. Id. Congress stated that the aggregate of such transactions was
“obviously substantial.” Id. See also Paisner, supra note 30, at 577–78 (suggesting that
Congress did not make any specific findings because it assumed the jurisdictional element
would ensure conformity within the limits of its commerce power).
50
Daker, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1344–45. “RLUIPA stands alone—enacted out of concern for
the protection of religious expression on federal land and in prison institutions—and not as
part of a greater scheme to regulate the sale of a commercial good or service.” Id. at 1346.
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (holding that Congress can constitutionally
regulate the intrastate medicinal use of marijuana). Congress, according to the Court,
possesses the ability to regulate “the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market.” Id. at 26.
In addition, the Raich Court opened the door for the regulation of non-economic activity
that does not substantially affect interstate commerce if the activity is part of a larger, more
comprehensive market, such as the national market. Id. at 17. The Court distinguished
Raich from Lopez and Morrison by arguing that the CSA directly regulated
“quintessentially” economic and commercial activity while those cases addressed noneconomic activity that was not part of a larger regulatory scheme. Id. at 25. The
determining factor is whether the larger, comprehensive scheme is economic, not whether
the regulated intrastate activity is economic in nature. Id. See Jonathan H. Adler,
Symposium, Federalism After Gonzalez v. Raich, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug
(Law) Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 764 (2005) (explaining that Raich relied heavily
on Wickard, but not even Wickard employed such an expansive approach).
See John T. Parry, Symposium, Federalism After Gonzalez v. Raich, “Society Must be
[Regulated]”: Biopolitics and the Commerce Clause in Gonzales v. Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 853, 859–60 (2005). The Raich Court relied heavily on the precedent established in
Wickard and, in the process, renewed faith in the Wickard test while casting serious doubts
as to the holdings of Lopez and Morrison:
Wickard is the heart of Commerce Clause doctrine, while Lopez and
Morrison are, if not outliers, at least cases that merely police the outer
boundaries of the doctrine to ensure that Congress is regulating
economic activity in the broad sense defined by Raich, which includes
production, distribution, possession, or consumption of a commodity
that moves in interstate commerce or that either effects interstate
commerce or effects the regulation of interstate commerce.
Id. As a result, Congress may not constitutionally regulate a certain activity standing alone,
but Congress may regulate that activity through the larger comprehensive regulatory
scheme. Id. at 862. In other words, “the more Congress regulates, the more it can
regulate.” Id. See also Adler, supra, at 764–65. For example:
A comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing commercial
day-care services could justify regulating childcare in the home. A
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing prepackaged frozen
dinners could justify regulating domestic food preparation.
A
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing land sales could justify
the complete displacement of local zoning.
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Clause analysis, another question raised in Daker, which is at the heart of
RLUIPA challenges and has yet to be definitively answered, concerns the
type of damages that are available to prevailing plaintiffs.
C. Availability of Damages
RLUIPA’s legislative history suggests that Congress intended to
create a private cause of action against state officials or employees, but
did not wish to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity by
opening them to suit.51 Nonetheless, numerous plaintiffs have sought
damages in RLUIPA challenges against state officials in their official or
individual capacities.52
Here, determining whether RLUIPA is
Id. Home childcare and domestic food preparation are not economic activities. Id. at 764.
But see Douglas F. Kmiec, Gonzales v. Raich: Wickard v. Filburn Displaced, 2005 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 71, 72 , 92 (2005) (arguing that Raich has pushed Wickard to the “outer limit” of
federal power by giving too much deference to Congress).
51
146 CONG. REC. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady). See U.S.
CONST. amend. XI. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Id. See
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1890). Since Hans v. Louisiana, states have been immune
from suits by both their own citizens and citizens from other states. Id. See Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 149 (1908). The Ex parte Young exception allows state officers to be sued for
injunctive relief that will enjoin official state action, but does not allow for monetary
damages. Id. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16, at 201 n.122 (noting that several cases in
the Nineteenth Century held that the Eleventh Amendment did not preclude suits against
state officials). Exceptions exist, however, that allow a citizen to sue a government official
in federal court. Id. at 201–03. Another way to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment is to
sue a state official in his or her individual capacity. Id.
52
See Yates v. Painter, 306 F. App’x 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2009) (asking for $50,000 in punitive
damages and $10,000 in compensatory damages from each of the thirteen defendants);
Porter v. Jones, No. 5:06cv178-MTP, 2009 WL 198945, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 27, 2009)
(requesting compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $2000 from each
defendant); Rust v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs. Religion Study Comm., No. 4:08CV3185, 2008
WL 5109763, at *1 (D. Neb. Dec. 1, 2008) (seeking $10,000 for RLUIPA violations). See also
42. U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006).
Also, limiting the availability of damages is the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(“PLRA”), which bars claims of damages for mental and emotional distress without
physical injury. Id. See also Larson, supra note 29 (arguing that PLRA should not bar claims
for compensatory damages for the loss of free exercise rights). Before PLRA, First
Amendment violations allowed recovery of compensatory damages, but the judicial
application of PLRA has nearly eliminated the availability of damages for violations of
those rights. Id. at 1470. According to Larson, even though RLUIPA creates a statutory
right, a RLUIPA deprivation should be treated as a First Amendment loss of free exercise.
Id. RLUIPA plaintiffs bring claims for the deprivation of their free exercise rights that
cause actual injury, such as the loss of opportunity, or the deprivation of the right of free
exercise. Id. For such injuries, PLRA should not bar damages because claims of mental and
emotional distress are connected or identifiable to the free exercise loss. Id. While the
Supreme Court does not allow damages to be awarded for the loss of abstract rights, it does
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allow damages of specific losses, such as the loss of worship services or sacred objects. Id.
Moreover, if PLRA is read to prohibit damages when no physical injury occurs, then
isolated RLUIPA violations that are not likely to recur will have no remedy. Id. at 1471.
Predictably, the circuits are split on the issue of PLRA as applied to RLUIPA. Id. at 1455–
59; Corbett H. Williams, Note, Evisceration of the First Amendment: The Prison Litigation
Reform Act and Interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) in Prisoner First Amendment Claims, 39
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 859, 864–81 (2006) (describing the circuit split of PLRA to First
Amendment claims in general). See also Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d
599, 605 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that PLRA prohibits damages under RLUIPA claims unless
physical injury is shown); Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 804 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that
PLRA limits the availability of compensatory and punitive damages, but nominal damages
could be available); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007) (same). But see
Porter v. Caruso, No. 1:05-cv-562, 2008 WL 3978972, 9–10 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2008)
(finding that punitive damages can be appropriate for mental or emotional injury). See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Parker, No. CIV-07-599-W, 2008 WL 2894842, at *20 (W.D. Okla. July 25, 2008).
Often RLUIPA claims are accompanied by Section 1983 claims for damages against
officials in their individual capacities for violations of the First Amendment right to free
exercise. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (barring any person acting under the color of state
law to cause a person’s deprivation of any of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and
its laws). RLUIPA, however, forecloses Section 1983 claims because it creates its own
remedial scheme. Thomas, 2008 WL 2894842, at *20 n.34 (citing City of Rancho Palos Verdes
v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005)) (stating that where Congress created a separate statutory
remedy, recovery under Section 1983 was normally precluded). See West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In addition, Section 1983 claims require a different constitutional
standard than claims under RLUIPA. Id. “To state a claim under [Section] 1983, a plaintiff
must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law.” Id. See Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 186 (4th Cir. 2006). A claim
under Section 1983 requires First Amendment analysis, while the same claim under
RLUIPA requires a more stringent standard as set forth in the statute. Id. RLUIPA requires
a “more searching standard of review of free exercise burdens than the standard used in
parallel constitutional claims: strict scrutiny instead of reasonableness.” Id. (internal
citations omitted). First Amendment claims in the prison context must be reasonably
related to the penological interests and are analyzed under the Turner test:
(1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the prison
regulation or action and the interest asserted by the government, or
whether this interest is “so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or
irrational”; (2) whether “alternative means of exercising the
right . . . remain open to prison inmates,” an inquiry that asks broadly
whether inmates were deprived of all forms of religious exercise or
whether they were able to participate in other observances of their
faith; (3) what impact the desired accommodation would have on
security staff, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4)
whether there exist any “obvious, easy alternatives” to the challenged
regulation or action, which may suggest that it is “not reasonable, but
is [instead] an exaggerated response to prison concerns.
Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 200 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–92 (1987)) (alteration in
original). If prison officials fail to produce evidence that a policy or action stemmed from a
legitimate penological justification, the court will rule in favor of the inmate. Id. See
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that prison officials could
not justify forcing Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims to conduct Ramadan ceremonies jointly for
the legitimate penological concerns of security, space, fiscal concerns, and staffing
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applicable to the states through the Commerce or Spending Clauses and
whether the statute contains a sovereign immunity waiver dictates what
types of damages are available.53 Thus, alternative views towards
damages in official capacity claims are discussed first followed by the
almost universally accepted bar against damages in individual capacity
claims.54
1.

Damages in Official Capacity Claims

Judicial decisions concerning the availability of monetary damages
under RLUIPA in official capacity claims lack consistency.55 On one
hand, the majority of courts, including the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits, hold the language of RLUIPA is ambiguous and
does not unequivocally condition acceptance of federal funds as a waiver
of a state’s consent to suit for monetary damages.56 On the other, those
in the minority, including the Eleventh Circuit, hold the phrase
“appropriate relief” to clearly condition a state’s waiver of Eleventh
limitations without presenting evidence that separate ceremonies would implicate these
penological interests). See also Mitchell v. Dep’t of Corr., No. CV-07-0107-LRS, 2008 WL
4527863, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 3, 2008) (stating that an action that passed constitutional
muster may not pass under RLUIPA, but if the action was valid under RLUIPA it must be
constitutionally valid). See generally supra Part II.A (discussing the strict scrutiny standard
established by RLUIPA).
53
See supra Part II.A (discussing congressional authority under the Spending and
Commerce Clauses).
54
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing current positions towards damages in the official
capacity); Part II.B.2 (discussing damages in the individual capacity).
55
Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007) (“To put it mildly, ‘there is a
division of authority’ on this question.” (quoting Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 130 n.3
(4th Cir. 2006))). See also Caruso, 2008 WL 3978972, at *3 (noting “no consensus” among the
circuits on whether accepting federal prison funds amounts to a waiver); Farrow v. Stanley,
No. Civ.02-567-PB, 2005 WL 2671541, at *11 n.13 (D.N.H. Oct 20, 2005) (observing that
“[t]here is substantial uncertainty, however, as to whether this language even provides a
right to money damages”); Sisney v. Reisch, 533 F. Supp. 2d 952, 967 (D.S.D. 2008) (noting
“wide division” on the issue).
56
Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 883–85 (7th Cir. 2009); Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d
794, 798–801 (6th Cir. 2009); Sossamon v. Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 329–31 (5th Cir. 2009); Scott v.
Beard, 252 F. App’x 491, 492–93 (3d Cir. 2007); Madison, 474 F.3d at 129–31; Sokolsky v.
Voss, No. 1:07 CV-00594 SMM, 2009 WL 2230871, at *4–6 (E.D. Cal. July 24, 2009); Caruso,
2008 WL 3978972, at *7; Grady v. Holmes, No. 07-cv-02251-EWN-CBS, 2008 WL 3539274, at
*2–3 (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 2008); Pugh v. Goord, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477, 506–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2008);
Sharp v. Johnson, No. 00-2156, 2008 WL 941686, at *19 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2008); Agrawal v.
Briley, No. 02 C 6807, 2006 WL 3523750, at *6–9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006); James v. Price, No.
2:03-CV-0209, 2005 WL 483443, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2005) (stating that the State of Texas,
by statute, refused to waive immunity from monetary claims). See generally Sisney, 533 F.
Supp. 2d at 969–70 (listing courts that ruled the Eleventh Amendment barred damages);
Larson, supra note 29, at 1464 (noting that courts are finding that states only waive
immunity to suit, but not monetary damages).
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Amendment immunity upon acceptance.57 RLUIPA authorizes a person
to “obtain appropriate relief against a government[.]”58 On its face,
RLUIPA creates a private cause of action against state officials.59 In a
claim against a state official in his or her official capacity, the official can
assert defenses available to the state, including Eleventh Amendment
immunity.60 Most important to plaintiffs, damages are paid by the State
Allen, 502 F.3d at 1276; Garrison v. Dutcher, No. 1:07-CV-642, 2008 WL 4534098, at *5
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2008) (allowing damages in official capacity claims for summary
judgment purposes); Jones v. Rieben, No. 2:04cv1029-MHT, 2008 WL 4080360, at 4 (M.D.
Ala. Sept. 2, 2008) (following Allen); Morris v. Newland, No. CIV S-00-2794 GEB GGH P,
2008 WL 3892103, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2008) (suggesting that a bar of monetary relief
against individuals is not adequately supported in the case law, but finding that no
monetary relief is available when RLUIPA is retroactively applied). Some courts award
nominal damages, but no compensatory damages. See, e.g., Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897,
907 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming the award of $1,500 in nominal damages); Mayfield, 529 F.3d
at 606 (allowing only nominal damages); Subil v. Sheriff of Porter County, No. 2:04-CV0257 PS, 2008 WL 4690988, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 22, 2008) (finding that damages in the
official capacity were available, but only nominal damages in absence of physical injury
stating that “if he wins, all he’ll get is a dollar”); Shidler v. Moore, No. 3:05-CV-804 RM,
2008 WL 1924910, at 1 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 28, 2008) (allowing individual capacity claims for
nominal damages of $1); Shabazz v. Norris, No. 5:03CV00401-WRW/BD, 2007 WL 2819517,
at *7–8 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 26, 2007) (allowing claims for monetary damages to proceed but
finding that PLRA limited recovery to nominal damages).
58
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (2006). See also id. § 2000cc-5(4)(A). The term “government” is
defined as “(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the
authority of a State; (ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an
entity listed in clause (i); and (iii) any other person acting under color of State law[.]” Id.
59
Id. See also Madison, 474 F.3d at 129–31 (finding that the issue of whether the state
consented to suit was not the question; rather, the correct inquiry was what forms of relief
were available to the plaintiff); Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1306 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“[The State] was on clear notice that by accepting federal funds for its prisons, [it] waived
its immunity from suit under RLUIPA.”); Ketzner v. Williams, No. 4:06-CV-73, 2008 WL
4534020, at *28 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2008) (assuming arguendo that RLUIPA authorized a
cause of action for damages).
60
See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that a suit
against a state official in the official capacity was “no different from a suit against the State
itself”). See also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985). Thus, an official can use
Eleventh Amendment immunity in the official capacity, but not in the individual capacity.
Id.
See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201
(2001) (criticizing the doctrine of sovereign immunity). The origin of sovereign immunity
is derived from English law that held “the King can do no wrong” and has long been
strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. Id. at 1201. See also Schillinger v. United States,
155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894). This principle, however, seems to conflict with American
jurisprudence that no one, including the government, is above the law. Chemerinsky,
supra, at 1202. In addition, sovereign immunity violates basic constitutional principles and
is often criticized. Id. at 1211–12; Marcia L. McCormick, Federalism Re-Constructed: The
Eleventh Amendment’s Illogical Impact on Congress’ Power, 37 IND. L. REV. 345 (2004) (arguing
that the Court’s approach to the Eleventh Amendment makes it difficult for Congress to
protect individuals from improper state action). But see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh
57
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in official capacity claims if RLUIPA serves as a waiver for Eleventh
Amendment immunity to monetary relief.61 The voluntary acceptance of
a federal spending program can be a waiver provided that Congress
expressed “a clear intent to condition participation . . . on a State’s
consent to waive its constitutional immunity” (“clear statement doctrine”
or “the doctrine”).62 The statute must explicitly include the waiver
because consent cannot be given through implication or ambiguous
language. 63 Conversely, Congress cannot use its Article I powers, such
as its commerce power, to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.64
Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1225, 1225 (2001) (arguing that
Eleventh Amendment immunity preserves accountability of government to taxpayers).
Damages against the state are not usually paid by or subtracted from the offending
program’s budget, but are paid through general state funds. Id. With injunctions, the
agency must decide how to comply, thus reallocating its existing resources. Id.
61
See Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the Ideology of the
Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L.J. 1167, 1178–84 (2003) [hereinafter Waivers of Sovereign
Immunity] (explaining the four exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity). States have
no immunity, however, from suits brought by other states or by the federal government.
Id. at 1181.
62
Madison, 474 F.3d at 129 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247
(1985)). The Atascadero Court stated that the clarity needed for a state to waive its
immunity had to be “by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication
from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” 473 U.S. at
239–40. The Court held that the states did not consent to federal jurisdiction for violations
of the Rehabilitation Act by accepting federal funds because the statute’s terms were
unclear. Id. at 240. See also Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement
Rules with Clear Thinking about Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 158
(2004) (explaining that this doctrine enjoys virtually unanimous support and even staunch
federalists support it).
63
Madison, 474 F.3d at 130 (citing Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)). In Lane, the
Court held that Congress did not draft the Rehabilitation Act with enough clarity to
constitute a waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity against awards of
monetary relief and set forth the clarity needed in such a situation:
A waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity must be
unequivocally expressed in statutory text, and will not be implied.
Moreover, a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be
strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign. To
sustain a claim that the Government is liable for awards of monetary
damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity must extend
unambiguously to such monetary claims. A statute’s legislative
history cannot supply a waiver that does not appear clearly in any
statutory text; “the ‘unequivocal expression’ of elimination of
sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory
text.”
518 U.S. at 192 (citations omitted). In Lane, the petitioner sued the United States Merchant
Marine Academy for disqualifying him due to his diabetic condition. Id. at 189. The
damages provision in question stated that the remedies available for violations in Title VI
would also be available for violations “by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal
provider of such assistance.” Id. at 192. The Court found the term “Federal Provider”
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The Fourth Circuit, in Madison v. Virginia, found that RLUIPA failed
to adhere to the clear statement doctrine.65 In Madison, the Fourth Circuit
strictly construed the scope of any ambiguities to the benefit of the
sovereign.66 The term “appropriate relief,” the Fourth Circuit concluded,
ambiguous because it could refer to federal funding agencies or other executive agencies
that were subject to monetary liability. Id. See also Richard H. Seamon, Damages for
Unconstitutional Affirmative Action: An Analysis of the Monetary Claims in Hopwood v. Texas,
71 TEMP. L. REV. 839, 873–77 (1998) (discussing in greater detail the facts and holding of
Lane).
See generally California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 506 (1998)
(recognizing that although waiver of federal sovereign immunity is not a waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity, cases of federal sovereign immunity provide guidance in
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence); United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33
(1992) (holding that decisions concerning federal sovereign immunity were not binding on
Eleventh Amendment immunity issues and vice versa).
64
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55–57, 59 (1996) (holding that
Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity through section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but not through other federal powers such as the Commerce
Clause). The Court in Seminole Tribe stated:
Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making
authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
unconsenting States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial
power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.
Id. at 72–73. See also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001)
(listing examples where courts have rejected Congress’s ability to open non-consenting
states to suit in federal courts through Article I); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 79
(2000) (“Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967] rests solely on Congress’ Article I commerce power, the private
petitioners in today’s cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers.”).
65
474 F.3d at 118–19. In Madison, the plaintiff was a Hebrew Israelite and member of
Temple Beth El, which required the eating of a kosher diet and the celebration of Passover.
Id. at 123. Legal action ensued after the local prison officials approved Madison’s request
for a kosher diet, but the Virginia Department of Corrections overruled the approval citing
that the regular, vegetarian, and non-pork prison menus served as adequate alternatives
and questioned the sincerity of Madison’s religious beliefs. Id.
66
Id. at 131. The Madison court also noted that RLUIPA did not mention monetary relief
nor the Eleventh Amendment generally. Id. Moreover, the consent to suit is not the same
as the consent to monetary damages. Id. See Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 37 (denying recovery
of damages under the Bankruptcy Act). “[L]egislative history has no bearing on the
ambiguity point . . . [because] the ‘unequivocal expression’ of elimination of sovereign
immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text. If clarity does not exist
there, it cannot be supplied by a committee report.” Id. See S. Elizabeth Gibson,
Congressional Response to Hoffman and Nordic Village: Amended Section 106 and Sovereign
Immunity, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 312–21 (1995) (discussing the events leading to Nordic
Village). But see Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 39–46 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority’s approach of ignoring the legislative history in its analysis of the statutory waiver
to sovereign immunity). “The congressional purpose to waive sovereign immunity is
pellucidly clear. The Court evaded this conclusion by hypothesizing ‘plausible’ alternative
constructions of the statute, by refusing to consider its legislative history, and by reiterating
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was ambiguous in the sense that it could potentially include all forms of
relief, but could also be interpreted to exclude monetary damages.67 Had
Congress desired to provide monetary damages, it could have easily
expressed that intention.68
Shortly after the Fourth Circuit concluded that RLUIPA failed the
clear statement doctrine, the Eleventh Circuit found damages available
the Court’s view that waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.” Id at 41–
42. The majority in Nordic Village also recognized this was not an absolute rule considering
that the Court had read the “sweeping language” of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)
to waive sovereign immunity for monetary relief consistent with Congress’s clear intent.
Id. at 34. See generally Gibson, supra, at 325–47 (discussing the legislative history of the
amendment and the constitutionality of the statute in question in Nordic Village). After
Nordic Village, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to explicitly abrogate sovereign
immunity. Id. at 325.
See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983) (defining the term
“appropriate” when determining available relief to mean “specially suitable: fit, proper”).
The respondents challenged standards promulgated by the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”). Id. at 681. Even though the respondents lost the challenge, they argued it
was appropriate for them to be awarded fees for their contribution towards the goals of the
Clean Air Act. Id. Under Section 307(f) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (2006),
attorney’s fees can be awarded “whenever [the court] determines that such an award is
appropriate.” Id. at 681–82 (alteration in original). Awarding fees to the losing party is
inconsistent with the normal rules of fee-shifting and doing so would enlarge appropriate
relief “beyond what a fair reading of the language of the section requires.” Id. at 685–86.
67
Madison, 474 F.3d at 132 (labeling “appropriate relief” as “open-ended”); Porter v.
Caruso, No. 1:05-cv-562, 2008 WL 3978972, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2008) (stating that
RLUIPA’s text is susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations); Agrawal v. Briley, No.
02 C 6807, 2006 WL 3523750, at *6–9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006) (holding that RLUIPA did not
contain explicit language to waive sovereign immunity). See Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. 30, 34–35
(1992) (holding that the provision in question did not create an unequivocal textual waiver
because it allowed for two plausible interpretations: injunctive and declaratory relief or
monetary damages); Gary A. v. New Trier High Sch. Dist. No. 203, 796 F.2d 940, 942–43
(7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (rejecting the claim that a statute authorizing courts to “grant
such relief as the court determines is appropriate” served as a textual waiver for states to
consent to suit in federal court); Seamon, supra note 63, at 884 (criticizing the requirement
for Congress to speak in “crystalline clarity” because it hampered the ability of the courts
to protect individuals). See also Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022, 1026
(D.C. Cir. 2006). So far the D.C. Circuit is the only circuit to confront a similar question
concerning the provision in RFRA that allowed for “appropriate relief” against the federal
government, concluding the language was “open-ended and equivocal.” Id.
68
Madison, 474 F.3d at 132. The Fourth Circuit also looked to the Civil Rights Act of
1991 that permitted an aggrieved party “[to] recover compensatory . . . damages.” Id. at
132 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (2006)) (alteration in original). See Joseph H. Bredehoft,
Note, Religious Expression and the Penal Institution: The Role of Damages in RLUIPA
Enforcement, 74 MO. L. REV. 153, 162–63 (2009) (summarizing the Fourth Circuit’s
examination of CRREA as applied to RLUIPA). See also Agrawal, 2006 WL 3523750, at *7
(finding that the Seventh Circuit grants a textual waiver only when the federal statute
explicitly declares “[a] State shall not be immune” (citing Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park & River
Forest High Sch. Dist. 200 v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2000) (alteration in
original))).
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against officials in their official capacity in Smith v. Allen.69 First, the
Allen court found that “appropriate relief” was a clear textual waiver and
that by accepting RLUIPA’s terms, the state consented to suit.70 Next,
the Allen court considered what remedies “appropriate relief”
encompassed.71 The Eleventh Circuit relied heavily upon the Supreme
Court’s decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, which
resolved the question of what remedies are available in a private right of
action for a sex discrimination claim under Title IX.72 The Title IX statute
did not address what remedies or even if a private right of action was
available, but the Franklin Court found it appropriate to “presume the
availability of all appropriate remedies unless Congress had expressly
indicated otherwise.”73 Applying the reasoning in Franklin to the
69
502 F.3d 1255, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007). Smith, the Plaintiff, practiced Odinism, an ancient
pre-Christian religion also known as Asatru. Id. at 1261. Odinists strive to follow the
“Nine Noble Virtues”:
courage, truth, honor, fidelity, discipline, hospitality,
industriousness, self-reliance, and perseverance. Id. Attaining these virtues requires
practicing members to communicate with ancient Norse gods through the study of ancient
runes, practicing certain rites on specified days, and observing holidays. Id. As a result,
Smith made numerous requests, most of which were granted, such as a spot to worship,
the ability to wear a Thor’s hammer necklace, a small fire in the form of a candle, and
formal recognition of Odinism as a valid religion. Id. at 1263. The only request denied to
Smith was the possession of a small quartz crystal. Id. See also Odinic Rite: Odinism for
the Modern World, Questions and Answers about the OR and Odinism,
http://www.odinic-rite.org/qa.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2009). The Odinic Rite also has a
Prison Affair Bureau offering a link to the RLUIPA statute. Odinic Rite, Prison Affairs
Bureau, http://www.odinic-rite.org/PAB/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
70
Allen, 502 F.3d at 1275–76. The Allen court reaffirmed an earlier Eleventh Circuit
decision that found RLUIPA waived Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 1276. See also
Hankins v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., No. 9:07-CV-0408 (FJS/GHL), 2008 WL 2019655, at
*7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2008) (“It appears that, after the enactment of RLUIPA in 2000, states
could accept federal funds for prison activities or programs only on the condition that they
comply with RLUIPA, which effectively constituted a waiver of their sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment.”).
71
Allen, 502 F.3d at 1269–71. See also Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1305–06 (11th
Cir. 2004). Benning, decided before Allen, did not address what “appropriate relief” entails,
only that states waive their immunity to suit for appropriate relief. Id.
72
See Allen, 502 F.3d at 1270–71; Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 65
(1992) (finding an implied right of action in Title IX claims included monetary damages).
In Franklin, the Court discussed the general rule “where legal rights have been invaded,
and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts
may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” 503 U.S. at 66 (citing Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 628, 684 (1946)). See also Kelly S. Terry, Note, Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools: Reviving the Presumption of Remedies Under Implied Rights of Action, 46 ARK.
L. REV. 715, 726–32 (1993) (explaining the emergence, disappearance, and the full-fledged
revitalization of the presumption of remedies in Franklin).
73
Allen, 502 F.3d at 1270 (quoting Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66). The Franklin Court also noted
that “absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress,” federal courts have the ability to
award any appropriate relief for a cause of action established by federal statute. 503 U.S. at
70–71. See Sisney v. Reisch, 533 F. Supp. 2d 952, 972 (D.S.D. 2008) (agreeing with the
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“appropriate relief” provision of RLUIPA, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that the lack of any congressional intent to the contrary
should allow for both injunctive and compensatory relief because it was
“broad enough to encompass the right to monetary damages.”74
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit assumed that Congress could have easily
limited the remedy to injunctive relief and that Congress was well aware
of the Franklin presumption of all appropriate remedies to the prevailing
party.75 Therefore, the court could award monetary damages in official
capacity suits.76
Eleventh Circuit that “appropriate relief” encompasses all forms of relief, but disagreeing
on the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity). See also Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175,
1177 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, sub nom. O’Leary v. Mack, 522 U.S. 801 (1997). The Seventh
Circuit allowed for damages against the state official because RFRA “says nothing about
remedies except that a person whose rights under the Act are violated ‘may assert that
violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against
a government.’” Id. See also Reich v. Cambridgeport Air Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187, 1191 (1st
Cir. 1994) (holding that the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) encompassed all
forms of relief, including monetary damages). The First Circuit interpreted “all appropriate
relief” to include monetary damages as well as other forms of relief normally available. Id.
74
Allen, 502 F.3d at 1270. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002). The Court in
Barnes, unlike in Franklin, described the scope of appropriate relief. Id. Gorman brought a
private cause of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. Although Title VI
does not expressly create a private cause of action, the Court has found that it is implied,
but the extent of those remedies is not clear. Id. The Court relied on the contract theory to
determine the scope of damage remedies:
[A] remedy is “appropriate relief,” only if the funding recipient is on
notice that, by accepting federal funding, it exposes itself to liability of
that nature. A funding recipient is generally on notice that it is subject
not only to those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant
legislation, but also to those remedies traditionally available in suits
for breach of contract. Thus we have held that under Title IX, which
contains no express remedies, a recipient of federal funds is
nevertheless subject to suit for compensatory damages and injunction
forms of relief traditionally available in suits for breach of contract.
Id. at 187 (internal citations omitted). When a federal recipient violates the conditions of
spending legislation, the wrong amounts to a breach of contract and is only rectified when
the recipient compensates the Federal Government or the third party beneficiary for the
loss caused. Id. at 189. Moreover, the Barnes Court held its decision was within the “well
settled” rule of Bell that so long as a cause of action existed under the Constitution or
federal statute, it is within the federal courts power to award appropriate relief. Id. (citing
Bell, 327 U.S. at 684). But see Williams v. Beltran, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1061–62 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (finding that the presumption of the availability of all damages does not presume a
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Sisney, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 972 n.2 (same).
75
Allen, 502 F.3d at 1270. The Allen court found that Congress by making all appropriate
remedies available, in conjunction with the waiver to suit, allowed for recovery of damages
against officials in their official capacity:
Congress expressed no intent to the contrary within RLUIPA, even
though it could have, by, for example, explicitly limiting the remedies
set forth in [Section] 2000cc(a) to injunctive relief only. Instead,
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Considering the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits’ approaches to the
clear statement doctrine under RLUIPA, the District Court of
Connecticut in El Badrawi v. Department of Homeland Security found flaws
in each analysis.77 First, the court found the Eleventh Circuit’s reliance
on Franklin to be flawed because Franklin involved a municipal
defendant, which had no Eleventh Amendment protection.78 Next, the
El Badrawi court criticized the Fourth Circuit for not considering a
provision of RLUIPA that allows the United States to “bring an action for
injunctive or declaratory relief to enforce compliance with this Act.”79
Thus, the court found that the use of “appropriate relief,” while granting
the federal government the right to seek injunctive or declaratory relief,
also suggests that appropriate relief could include monetary damages or
Congress used broad, general language in crafting the remedies
section of RLUIPA, stating that a prevailing party could obtain
“appropriate relief.” We assume that, when Congress acted, it was
aware of Franklin’s presumption in favor of making all appropriate
remedies available to the prevailing party.
Id. But see Pugh v. Goord, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477, 507–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that after
considering both the analysis of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, many courts have sided
with the Fourth Circuit’s finding that no damages are available in the official capacity).
76
Allen, 502 F.3d at 1270.
77
579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 258–61 (D. Conn. 2008).
78
Id. at 256. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63–64 (1992); N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham
County, 547 U.S. 189, 193–94 (2006) (refusing to extend Eleventh Amendment immunity to
state counties); Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 466–67 (2003) (holding that an
unmistakably clear statement is not required by Congress to establish a municipality
liability for monetary damages). See also Gregory J. Wong, Note, Intent Matters: Assessing
Sovereign Immunity for Tribal Entities, 82 WASH. L. REV. 205, 213–219 (2007) (explaining that
the courts defer to the state legislature’s intent to decide if Eleventh Amendment immunity
extends to state-created entities).
79
Compare El Badrawi, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(f) (2006)), with
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (2006) (establishing a private right of action for “appropriate relief
against the government”). See Waivers of Sovereign Immunity, supra note 61, at 1181. One
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity is a suit brought by a state or by the federal
government. Id. See Jonathan R. Siegel, Congress’s Power to Authorize Suits Against States, 68
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 44, 67–70 (1999) [hereinafter Suits Against States]. The federal
government may bring suit for monetary damages, even choosing to distribute awarded
damages to the victims of the violations. Id. “Espousal of private claims is a perfectly
legitimate use of the federal government’s power to sue states; it is not regarded, even by
those partial to state sovereign immunity, as an inappropriate attempt to evade the ban on
private suits against states.” Id. at 70. For example, under the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”), the Secretary of Labor can bring suit against a state employer to recover lost
wages and distribute those to employees who suffered lost wages. Id. at 69 (citing
Employees of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health. & Welfare, 411 U.S.
279, 285–86 (1973). See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759–60 (1999). In Alden, the Court
did not allow state probation officers to recover lost wages under the FLSA, but in dicta,
the Court noted a difference between “a suit by the United States on behalf of the
employees and a suit by the employees . . . and the structure of the Constitution make clear
that . . . the States have consented to suits of the first kind but not of the second.” Id.
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at the very least encompass more than just injunctive or declaratory
relief.80 Even so, the court found that the ambiguity of “appropriate
relief” still does not create a clear condition that participation is consent
to waive a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, thereby precluding
any recovery of monetary damages.81
In addition to courts considering RLUIPA’s textual waiver, the Civil
Rights Remedies Equalization Act of 1986 (“CRREA”) may also contain
an unequivocal waiver of state sovereign immunity.82 The CRREA
waives Eleventh Amendment immunity for violations of specific
enumerated acts of Congress.83 Also included in CRREA is a catch-all
El Badrawi, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 261. The court posed this interesting dilemma:
This prompts an important question: if the phrase “appropriate relief”
in subsection (a) refers only to injunctive or declaratory relief, why
does subsection (f) expressly specify that the federal government may
sue for “injunctive and declaratory relief?” Why does it not instead
say that the federal government can sue for “appropriate relief” if that
same phrase in subsection (a) means “injunctive and declaratory
relief?”
Id. Moreover, if the court was not considering RLUIPA as a waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity, it would “easily” determine that RLUIPA allowed for monetary
damages. Id.
81
Id. at 261. The El Badrawi court also found that the history of RLUIPA supports
ambiguity in the phrase “appropriate relief.” Id. By enacting RLUIPA, Congress stated its
desire to restore religious protection in the pre-Smith era. Id. Before Smith, the Eleventh
Amendment prohibited monetary damages from states for religious violations. Id. at 262.
But see Larson, supra note 29, at 1444–49 (explaining that before Smith, actual injury,
including the loss of the constitutional right, resulted in compensatory damages, but if no
injury, then the court could award punitive or nominal damages or an injunction if the
injury was likely to be repeated).
82
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2006). See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 200 (1996) (stating in dicta
that in CRREA, “Congress responded to our decision in Atascadero by crafting an
unambiguous waiver of the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity”); Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (stating that Congress must manifest a clear
intent to condition funds on the state’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Alfred
Hill, In Defense of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485, 538 (2001) (explaining the Court
has taken this rigid stance on Eleventh Amendment waiver because it upsets federalism
between the states and federal government). See also Barbour v. Wash. Mem’l Area Transit
Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (listing circuit court opinions that have found
CRREA to be unambiguous). All circuits, except for the Federal Circuit, which has yet to
address the issue, have found CRREA to be an unambiguous textual waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment. Id.
83
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7. The relevant section of the statute reads in full:
A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a
violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . , title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972 . . . , the Age Discrimination
Act of 1975 . . . , title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . , or the
provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by
recipients of Federal financial assistance.
80
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provision waiving immunity for “provisions of any other Federal statute
prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial
assistance.”84 The Fourth Circuit in Madison first considered RLUIPA’s
textual waiver under CRREA, finding that RLUIPA was different than
the enumerated acts included in CRREA because it did not prohibit
discrimination.85 Other courts disagree with the Fourth Circuit, finding
that the objective of RLUIPA to prevent discrimination is enough to fall
under CRREA.86
Id. For any violation by the State, remedies both in law and in equity are available. Id. The
specific statutes mentioned use similar language in prohibiting discrimination. See
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006) (prohibiting persons with a disability
by the sole reason of their disability to “be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination”); Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006) (using the same language, but prohibiting discrimination
based on gender in educational programs); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (2006) (using the same language, but prohibiting discrimination based on race,
color, or national origin); Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (2006) (stating
“[i]t is the purpose of this chapter to prohibit discrimination on the basis of age”).
84
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7. The catch-all provision has not found much success. See, e.g,
Cronen v. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs., 977 F.2d 934, 937–38 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
catch-all applied only to federal statutes with the stated purpose of prohibiting
discrimination); Grillo v. California, No. C 05-2559 SBA, 2006 WL 335340, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 14, 2006) (finding that a statute preventing unlawful retaliation did not fit under the
catch-all provision); Brum v. West Virginia, No. 6:04-cv-1014, 2005 WL 6147735, at *1 (S.D.
W.Va. Sept. 12, 2005) (holding that the catch-all did not apply because the plaintiff did not
allege he was discriminated against nor did he indicate which federal anti-discriminatory
statute protected him); Clemes v. Del Norte County United Sch. Dist., No. C-93-1912, 1996
WL 331096, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 1996) (finding that the specific FTCA section in
question was meant to protect those who assist in uncovering fraud, not discrimination,
and to fall under the catch-all provision the federal statute must contain a provision that
specifically prohibits discrimination); Ohta v. Muraski, No. 3:93 CV 00554 (JAC), 1993 WL
366525, at *4–5 (D. Conn. Aug. 19, 1993) (explaining that the broad and unspecific language
of the catch-all provision did not serve as an unequivocal textual waiver to antidiscriminatory statutes outside of the four specifically enumerated in Section 2000d-7).
85
Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 188, 132–33 (4th Cir. 2006). The Fourth Circuit found
that RLUIPA did not contain definitive language against discrimination, and it needed to
“be like” the statutes listed in CRREA. Id. at 133. Specifically, nowhere in the statutory text
does RLUIPA outlaw “discrimination” like those statutes enumerated in CRREA. Id. at
132–33. Instead, RLUIPA prohibits unjustified substantial burdens on prisoners’ rights to
exercise religion. Id. at 133. In addition, ambiguity exists whether RLUIPA is a federal
statute prohibiting discrimination, thus preventing states from knowingly consenting to
damages in actions brought against them. Id. See also Kaimowitz v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ.
of Ill., 951 F.2d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that Section 1983 did not specifically
prohibit discrimination and thus did not meet the catch-all provision in CRREA); Miraki v.
Chicago State Univ., 259 F. Supp. 2d 727, 731 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (finding that Section 1981 did
not fall in the catch-all provision of CRREA because it did not specifically prohibit
discrimination).
86
See Garrison v. Dutcher, No. 1:07-CV-642, 2008 WL 4534098, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30,
2008) (finding that for the purposes of summary judgment, monetary damages were
assumed against the state under RLUIPA by CRREA’s waiver); Sisney v. Reisch, 533 F.
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Damages in the Individual Capacity

Compared to official capacity suits, individual capacity suits differ in
two key ways.87 First, in individual capacity suits, plaintiffs seek
damages from the individual and not from the State treasury.88 Second,
defendants in individual capacity suits can assert personal immunities,
such as qualified immunity, while in official capacity suits defendants
can assert defenses available to the sovereign entity.89 Similar to official
capacity suits, the availability of damages in individual capacity suits
changes if the RLUIPA claim is under the Spending or Commerce
Supp. 2d 952, 971–72 (D.S.D. 2008) (analyzing the applicability of the CRREA’s waiver to
RLUIPA). The Sisney court relied heavily on the Seventh Circuit, which quoted the Ninth
Circuit by saying, “RLUIPA follows in the footsteps of a long-standing tradition of federal
legislation that seeks to eradicate discrimination and is ‘designed to guard against unfair
bias and infringement on fundamental freedoms.’” Id. at 972 (quoting Charles v. Verhagen,
348 F.3d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Mayweathers v. Terhune, 314 F.3d 1062, 1066–67
(9th Cir. 2002))). See generally Bredehoft, supra note 68, at 165–68 (summarizing the Sisney
decision).
87
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing damages in official capacity suits).
88
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999) (“[A] suit for money damages may be
prosecuted against a state officer in his individual capacity for unconstitutional or
wrongful conduct fairly attributable to the officer himself, so long as the relief is sought not
from the state treasury but from the officer personally.”). See also FED R. CIV. P. 25(d). “An
action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in an official capacity dies,
resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending. The officer’s
successor is automatically substituted as a party.” Id. See generally Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 166 n.11 (1985). In an individual capacity suit, if the official dies the plaintiff
can continue the action against the official’s estate. Id. In an official capacity suit, however,
in the event of the official’s death or replacement, the plaintiff can continue the action
against the successor in office. Id.
89
Graham, 473 U.S. at 166–67. See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 2006).
The qualified immunity defense applies in individual capacity suits when officials sued for
actions while performing their discretionary responsibilities did not violate “clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). See also Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). A proper qualified immunity analysis requires two steps. Id.
First, the court examines whether the plaintiff’s allegations establish that an official’s
conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. If no violation is found, the court grants
defendant summary judgment, but if the court finds that a violation can be shown, the next
step is to find whether the right was clearly established. Id. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (stating that a clearly established right “is not to say that an official
action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously
been held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness
must be apparent [to the official]”) (internal quotations omitted); Gaubatz, supra note 39, at
556 (explaining that officials who establish that they did not know their actions violated
RLUIPA at the time the challenged conduct occurred avoid individual liability). But see
Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 937, 954 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (holding that the defendant
violated RLUIPA, but qualified immunity barred damages); Larson, supra note 29, at 1464
(explaining that most early RLUIPA suits were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds).
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Clauses.90 Initially, courts allowed monetary damages in individual
capacity suits under the Spending Clause because “government” was
defined by RLUIPA to include all government officials or “any other
person acting under the color of State law,” thus holding officials liable
in their individual capacities.91
The Eleventh Circuit, however,
uncovered a flaw in this logic, holding that Congress cannot subject a
non-recipient of federal funds to private liability of monetary damages.92
Alternatively, individual capacity suits might be available if RLUIPA is
valid Commerce Clause legislation.93 It is not clear if RLUIPA is valid
under the Commerce Clause, and according to the Daker court,
90
See Rotunda, supra note 45, at 829–34 (detailing the relationship of the Commerce
Clause and the Eleventh Amendment). In legislation that applies to state action, the actions
of state officials are considered state action. Id. at 831. However, those officials are not
considered state actors in light of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 831–32. Thus, state
officials can be individually liable and forced to pay damages out of their own pockets. Id.
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the jurisdictional requirements of official capacity suits).
91
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(ii–iii) (2006). See Boretsky v. Corzine, No. 08-2265 (GEB),
2008 WL 5047939, at *6 n.5 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2008) (allowing claims of individual liability to
continue because the controlling circuit had yet to address the issue); Agrawal v. Briley,
No. 02 C 6807, 2006 WL 3523750, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006 (interpreting the plain
language of RLUIPA to include individual liability); Marsh v. Granholm, No. 2:05-cv-134,
2006 WL 2439760, at *10–11 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2006) (same); Orafan v. Goord, No.
00CV2022(LEK/RFT), 2003 WL 21972735, *9 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2003) (same). But see Boles
v. Neet, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1240 (D. Colo. 2005) (permitting claims against the
government and officials in their official capacities, not in their individual capacities);
Smith v. Haley, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1246 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (using a respondeat superior
theory to find that the RLUIPA statute could be read to include damages in the official
capacity, but nothing in the statute suggested government employees were liable for
damages in their individual capacities).
92
Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1272–75 (11th Cir. 2007). The Allen court used previous
circuit decisions concerning Title IX that prohibited private causes of actions against
defendants in their individual capacities because they are not recipients of federal funds.
Id. at 1273–74. The receipt of federal funds creates a contract between the government and
the recipient. Id. at 1273 (citing Gebster v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286
(1998). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the contracting party was the state prison
institution that received the federal funds and not their individual employees. Id. at 1274–
75. To find otherwise would raise serious constitutional concerns. Id. at 1275. As a result,
many district courts have found Allen persuasive and ruled that RLUIPA did not create a
private right of action against state employees in their individual capacities through the
Spending Clause. See Garrison v. Dutcher, No. 1:07-CV-642, 2008 WL 4534098, at *4 (W.D.
Mich. Sept. 30, 2008); Jones v. Rieben, No. 2:04cv1029-MHT, 2008 WL 4080360, at *4 (M.D.
Ala. Sept. 2, 2008); Porter v. Caruso, No. 1:05-cv-562, 2008 WL 3978972, at *8 (W.D. Mich.
Aug. 22, 2008); Grady v. Holmes, No. 07-cv-02251-EWN-CBS, 2008 WL 3539274, at *3 (D.
Colo. Aug. 12, 2008); Pugh v. Goord, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477, 507–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Sharp v.
Johnson, No. 00-2156, 2008 WL 941686, at *19 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2008); Sisney v. Reisch, 533
F. Supp. 2d 952, 968 (D.S.D. 2008). But see Horacek v. Burnett, No. 07-11885, 2008 WL
4427792, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 3, 2008).
93
See Allen, 502 F.3d at 1274 n.9 (recognizing RLUIPA’s Commerce Clause
underpinnings, but finding that the legislation hinged on the Spending Clause).
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construing the statute as Commerce Clause legislation raises “serious
question[s]” and would “unmoor RLUIPA from its firm grounding in the
Spending Clause . . . and engender debate about whether it regulates
localized, non-economic conduct that does not substantially affect
interstate commerce.”94
Even with Congress’s apparent desire to create a private cause of
action for damages, plaintiffs seeking monetary relief under RLUIPA
have not been very successful. For damages to exist under the Spending
Clause, RLUIPA must serve as a textual waiver to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.95 The Fourth Circuit finds RLUIPA does not contain a
waiver, while the Eleventh Circuit holds otherwise.96 Plaintiffs may be
able to find relief under the Commerce Clause, but the majority of courts
do not entertain the issue.97 Yet, no matter how plaintiffs attempt to
collect damages, uncertainty continues.98
III. ANALYSIS
As discussed above, uncertainty remains about the availability of
damages under RLUIPA.99 The discussion below attempts to find
answers by asking whether a textual waiver to state sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment for monetary damages can be found
under RLUIPA or CRREA.100 The next section determines if RLUIPA is
valid under the Commerce Clause.101 The last section addresses whether
courts, as a matter of public policy, should award damages for RLUIPA
violations.102
A. Resolving the Ambiguity
Under the clear statement doctrine, the Supreme Court disregards
legislative history as a source to determine congressional intent by

Daker v. Ferrero, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining the requirements for a textual waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
96
See supra Part II.C.1 (describing the split between the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit).
97
See supra note 40 and accompanying text (explaining reasons why courts often choose
to analyze RLUIPA under the Spending Clause and not the Commerce Clause).
98
See supra Part III (analyzing the availability of damages under RLUIPA).
99
See supra Part II (discussing the legal background to RLUIPA monetary claims).
100
See infra Part III.A.1 (analyzing the textual waiver in RLUIPA); Part III.B (analyzing
the textual waiver in CRREA).
101
See infra Part III.B (analyzing if RLUIPA is valid under the Commerce Clause and if
monetary damages are available).
102
See infra Part III.C (answering public policy questions about awarding damages to
prisoners for RLUIPA violations).
94
95
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requiring intent to derive solely from the statutory text.103 As a result,
satisfaction of the clear statement doctrine occurs when the statutory text
unambiguously conditions the voluntary acceptance of federal funds on
the state waiving its Eleventh Amendment immunity.104
1.

Searching for Statutory Guidance

For RLUIPA to satisfy the clear statement doctrine, all ambiguity
must be removed from the phrase “appropriate relief.”105 By applying
Franklin, which held that all forms of relief were available absent
contrary congressional intent, the Eleventh Circuit found that
“appropriate relief” satisfied the clear statement doctrine.106 Applying
Franklin to RLUIPA does not cure the ambiguity of “appropriate relief,”
as the Eleventh Circuit asserts, because the resolution is derived from
case law and not statutory text.107 To presume the availability of all
103
See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“[L]egislative history cannot supply a
waiver that does not appear clearly in any statutory text.”); United States v. Nordic Vill.,
Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 37 (1992) (explaining that the legislative history had no weight when
trying to decipher statutory ambiguity). See also supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the textual
requirements for a statutory waiver). But see Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 34 (recognizing that
the Court waived sovereign immunity in the FTCA because the Court found the sweeping
language of the Act consistent with congressional intent). Justice Stevens, in his dissent,
criticized the majority for ignoring the legislative history. Id. at 39–46 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); supra note 66 (discussing Stevens’ criticism of the majority). See also United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 550–51 (1951) (discussing the legislative history of
the FTCA).
104
See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text (explaining that according to Supreme
Court precedent, the clear statement doctrine must be expressed in the statutory text). See
also Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007). The Eleventh Circuit argued that
Congress could have easily limited RLUIPA’s remedies. Id. Instead, Congress used broad
language. Id. at 1271. Contra Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 132 (4th Cir. 2006) (arguing
that when Congress desired to make damages available, it used clear language). The
Madison court cited the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which permits a “complaining party [to]
recover compensatory . . . damages from . . . government actors.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)(2) (2006)) (alteration in original).
105
See Madison, 474 F.3d at 131–32 (finding “appropriate relief” as “open ended” because
it could be read to limit relief to injunctive and declaratory relief or to encompass all forms
of relief including monetary damages); Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022,
1026 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (concluding the same when it analyzed the same phrase in RFRA). See
also supra note 56 (listing the courts that have found the Eleventh Amendment bars
damages because “appropriate relief” is an ambiguous term).
106
Allen, 502 F.3d at 1270. RLUIPA contained no language limiting available remedies;
therefore “appropriate relief” included all remedies. Id. See supra notes 69–76 and
accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision). But see Williams v. Beltran,
569 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that applying Franklin is “inapposite to
the narrow question” of determining the availability of monetary relief).
107
See Allen, 502 F.3d at 1269–72. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60,
66 (1992) (discussing the general rule that when a right has been violated and a federal
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remedies against the state, the statutory text, not an outside source, must
provide guidance mandating a broad interpretation of the cause of
action.108
A possible solution within RLUIPA’s text is Section 2000cc-2(f),
which allows the federal government to bring an action for injunctive or
declaratory relief to force RLUIPA compliance.109 As a result, Congress
created two causes of action: (1) by the government for injunctive or
declaratory relief or (2) a private cause of action in which a person can
obtain appropriate relief.110 This dichotomy between the two causes of
action suggests “appropriate relief” encompasses monetary damages;
otherwise, Congress would not have limited the federal government’s
relief.111 With sovereign immunity strictly construed in favor of the
sovereign, suggesting damages are available will not hurdle the clear
statement doctrine because the availability of damages is only implied.112
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on Franklin and Section 2000cc-

statute provides the ability to sue for the violation, federal courts can use any remedy
available to cure the violation). Franklin presumed all remedies against municipalities;
however, municipalities cannot assert Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id.; supra notes 72–
74 and accompanying text (explaining the Franklin decision in more detail). See also Alden
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 709, 756 (1999) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment protects the State,
but not its lesser entities or any governmental entity that is not the arm of the state); Wong,
supra note 78, at 213–18 (discussing how courts decide if Eleventh Amendment immunity
extends to state-created entities).
108
See Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986) (holding that the Court
cannot “enlarge the waiver beyond what the language requires”) (internal quotations
omitted); Atascadero St. Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239–40 (1985) (requiring express
language or language that has no other reasonable construction).
109
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(f) (2006). See Suits Against States, supra note 79, at 69–70.
Congress included this provision in RLUIPA because it was necessary to prevent the
federal government from seeking monetary relief from states for violating RLUIPA. Id.
(explaining that the federal government can bring suit against the state for monetary
damages and distribute the damages to victims of the violations). See also Waivers of
Sovereign Immunity, supra note 61, at 1178–84 (outlining the two other exceptions to the
Eleventh Amendment—the Ex parte Young exception and abrogation by Congress through
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
110
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(f) (“The United States may bring an action for injunctive
or declaratory relief to enforce compliance with this chapter.”), with id. § 2000cc-2(a) (“A
person may . . . obtain appropriate relief . . . .”).
111
See El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 261 (D. Conn. 2008)
(stating that if the court was not deciding whether RLUIPA waived Eleventh Amendment
immunity, it could easily determine RLUIPA allowed monetary relief).
112
See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 187 (2002) (stating that “appropriate relief”
occurred when the state was on notice for liability by accepting federal funding to the
remedies explicitly identified). See also supra note 60 (explaining that sovereign immunity
has always been strictly construed in favor of the sovereign even though the principle of
sovereign immunity is against the basic premise of American jurisprudence that no one
person or government is above the law).
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2(f) only implies a broad reading of “appropriate relief” as other
reasonable interpretations exist.113
While an implied understanding of all available relief will not satisfy
the clear statement doctrine, clarity and an instruction to broadly
interpret “appropriate relief” to encompass monetary damages will
satisfy the doctrine.114 Section 2000cc-3(g) serves this purpose by stating:
“This chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of
religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this
chapter and the Constitution.”115 With this language, the statute requires
a broad understanding of “appropriate relief.”116 Courts find two
possible interpretations in construing the meaning of the phrase: (1)
injunctive and declaratory relief; or (2) monetary, injunctive, and
declaratory relief.117 Awarding only injunctive and declaratory relief
requires a narrow reading of RLUIPA, which is inconsistent with Section
2000cc-3(g) because a broader interpretation of “appropriate relief”
exists.118 The phrase “appropriate relief” never lacked the ability to
include monetary damages; it stumbled because of its ambiguity.119
Moreover, reliance on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Webman v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons, which interpreted RFRA’s “appropriate relief”
113
See El Badrawi, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 260–61. The reasoning of the El Badrawi court is
sound because Section 2000cc-2(f) only suggests a broad interpretation, rather than an
intention through clear expression. Id. See also supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text
(discussing the El Badrawi court’s decision to reject Section 2000cc-2(f) as a clear textual
waiver).
114
See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239–40 (1985) (emphasizing that a
state is on notice if the language expresses an overwhelming implication that leaves no
room for any other reasonable interpretation). See generally supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the
requirements for a state to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity).
115
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2006) (emphasis added). Section 2000cc-3(g) is labeled “Broad
Construction.” Id.
116
See id. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983) (defining “appropriate”
as “specially suitable: fit, proper”). In addition, “appropriate relief” should not be
expanded beyond a fair reading or be used inconsistent with standard practice. Id. at 686.
See also supra note 33 (listing examples of courts broadly construing the terms of RLUIPA).
117
See Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 131–32 (4th Cir. 2006) (construing the phrase to
include monetary relief as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, but ignoring Section
2000cc-3(g)); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating “appropriate
relief” is broad enough to encompass the right to monetary damages). See also supra note
67 (discussing the ambiguity to the phrase “appropriate relief”).
118
See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 70–71 (1992) (employing a
hierarchy of damages with monetary relief at the top). See also Reich v. Cambridgeport Air
Sys., Inc., 26 F.3d 1187, 1190–95 (1st Cir. 1994) (determining what forms of relief the phrase
“all appropriate relief” includes). In Reich, which was decided shortly after Franklin, the
First Circuit found the phrase included all forms of relief. Id. at 1191.
119
See, e.g., Sisney v. Reisch, 533 F. Supp. 2d 952, 972 n.2 (D.S.D. 2008) (noting that the
presumption of all available damages was not a presumption of a waiver to Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
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provision, is erroneous because RLUIPA’s statutory text is significantly
different from RFRA.120 Unlike RLUIPA, RFRA does not include an
analogous provision to Section 2000cc-3(g), and the absence of such a
provision significantly alters the analysis of “appropriate relief.”121 As a
result, the language of Section 2000cc-3(g) cures the ambiguity by
requiring each term to be construed to its “maximum extent.”122
In addition to resolving the ambiguity, the waiver must be
unequivocally expressed in the statutory text.123 The driving force
behind the Supreme Court’s rigid sovereign immunity jurisprudence is
clarity, but the Court does not require the expression to be in the clearest
possible form or to be understood in isolation from the rest of its
statutory text.124 In addition, the Supreme Court has not mandated
Congress to use specific boilerplate language; it requires only an
unambiguous waiver.125 When reading the statutory text of RLUIPA,
each term must be understood in its “maximum extent,” and the
“maximum extent” of appropriate relief, as a result, includes monetary
damages.126 Even if the Court rejects this proposition for lacking clarity,
RLUIPA’s statutory text left “no room for any other reasonable
construction.”127 Therefore, reading “appropriate relief” with Section
2000cc-3(g) meets the clear statement doctrine by placing the State on

120
See Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding
the provision in RFRA that allowed for “appropriate relief” against the federal government
was “open-ended and equivocal”).
121
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(2006) with id. § 2000bb.
122
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2006). See Merriam-Webster Online, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/maximum (last visited Aug. 29, 2009). Merriam-Webster defines
“maximum” as “an upper limit allowed (as by a legal authority) or allowable (as by the
circumstances of a particular case).” Id. An alternative definition states: “the greatest
quantity or value attainable or attained.” Id.
123
Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). “A waiver of the Federal Government’s
sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text, and will not be
implied . . . . [The] elimination of sovereign immunity . . . is an expression in statutory
text.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
124
See United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 37 (1992) (insisting that only clarity
is needed in the statutory text).
125
See Lane, 518 U.S. at 192 (stating that the statutory language must “extend
unambiguously to such monetary claims”); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685
(1983) (holding that statutory language should not be extended beyond what the language
requires).
126
See supra note 114–25 and accompanying text (explaining that understanding each
term of RLUIPA to the “maximum extent” requires “appropriate relief” to include
monetary relief because the other interpretation is narrower).
127
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 (1985). See also Galle, supra note
62, at 157 (criticizing the clear statement doctrine because it creates overly rigid statutes).
As a result, courts have no opportunity to interpret the statute for changed events or novel
issues. Id.
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notice that it waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity from monetary
relief by accepting federal funds.128
2.

CRREA’s Catch-All Provision as a Textual Waiver

In its present form, RLUIPA contains the unequivocal language
required for the clear statement doctrine, but the catch-all provision of
CRREA may also serve that purpose.129 CRREA’s provision applies to
any federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal
financial assistance and possibly allows for monetary damages against
officials in their official capacities.130 Doubts remain, however, whether
RLUIPA is an anti-discriminatory statute making CRREA applicable
because RLUIPA seeks to prevent the overburdening of institutionalized
persons’ religious free exercise.131 Compared to the enumerated federal
statutes in CRREA, RLUIPA does not offer language that its stated
purpose is to prohibit discrimination.132 Thus, absent a stated antidiscriminatory purpose, it is misguided to rely on the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits’ characterization of RLUIPA as “follow[ing] in the footsteps of a
long-standing tradition of federal legislation that seeks to eradicate
discrimination.”133 For example, federal statutes not enacted for the sole

See infra Part III.C (discussing why prisoners should receive damages for free exercise
violations); Part IV.A (discussing the implications of awarding damages to prisoners).
129
See supra part III.A.1 (analyzing RLUIPA’s statutory text for a waiver of damages).
130
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2006). The catch-all provision of CRREA states:
A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a
violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . , title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972 . . . , the Age Discrimination
Act of 1975 . . . , title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . , or the
provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by
recipients of Federal financial assistance.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
131
146 CONG. REC. S7991 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 2000) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). While
expressing his concerns about RLUIPA, Senator Thurmond stated:
I first wish to note what this bill is not. It is not directed at laws that
intentionally discriminate against a particular religion or even all
religions . . . .Rather, this bill is directed at laws that apply to everyone
equally, but have the effect of burdening someone’s exercise of his or
her religion.
Id.
132
See supra note 83 (providing the anti-discriminatory purposes of the enumerated
statutes in CRREA).
133
Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 2003). See Mayweathers v. Newland,
314 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating RLUIPA “foster[s] non-discrimination”). Both
circuits cited the prohibition of religious discrimination as one reason to satisfy the general
welfare requirement in Spending Clause analysis. Charles, 348 F.3d at 607; Mayweathers, 314
128
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purpose of preventing discrimination, but to prohibit some form of
discrimination, are not considered anti-discriminatory statutes.134
Despite Congress’s desire to protect prisoners from religious
discrimination through RLUIPA, the Act falls short of being an antidiscriminatory statute because it lacks a stated anti-discriminatory
purpose.135
The land use portion of RLUIPA specifically bars
discrimination in land use regulations, while the institutionalized
persons section of RLUIPA prohibits only a substantial burden against a
person’s free exercise of religion.136 Discrimination claims require
comparisons, but substantial burden analysis focuses on the prisoner’s
own ability to practice religion.137
As a result, free exercise
discrimination claims are best answered by the Equal Protection Clause

F.3d at 1067. See also Part II.B.1 (discussing RLUIPA’s constitutionality under the Spending
Clause).
134
Cronen v. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs., 977 F.2d 934, 937–38 (5th Cir. 1992). The issue
in Cronen was the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(c) (2006), which provided that “[i]n the
certification of applicant households for the food stamp program, there shall be no
discrimination by reason of race, sex, religious creed, national origin, or political beliefs.”
Id. at 937. Nonetheless, the court found that the statute was a comprehensive federal
entitlement program that happened to prohibit the discriminatory issuance of food stamps.
Id. at 938. See supra note 83 (listing other courts that have found certain federal statutes not
to be anti-discriminatory absent the specifically stated purpose to do so).
135
See 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and
Sen. Kennedy) (citing a major impetus for Congress to pass RLUIPA was to prevent
religious discrimination in prison). One case cited for the need of RLUIPA, Sasnett v.
Sullivan, 197 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1999), found that prison officials’ refusal to allow prisoners
to wear religious jewelry, such as religious crosses, amounted to discrimination against
Protestants. Id.
136
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2) (2006). The statute reads: “No government shall impose or
implement a land use regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on
the basis of religion or religious denomination.” Id. See 146 CONG. REC. E1564–67 (daily ed.
Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (offering many examples of land use
discrimination based on religion or religious denomination). In addition, the legislative
history appears to distinguish discrimination from substantial burden by establishing
different objectives for the land use provision and the institutionalized persons provision.
Id. at S7776 (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy) (stating “[t]he state may
eliminate the discrimination or burden in any way it chooses, so long as the discrimination
or substantial burden is actually eliminated”).
137
See, e.g., Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004). The standard used by the
Fifth Circuit to determine if a government regulation substantially burdened religious
exercise was “if it truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious
behavior and significantly violate his religious beliefs.” Id. (following Supreme Court
precedent, the Fifth Circuit held a governmental regulation to be significant when it
somehow influenced the adherent to violate his religious beliefs and forced the adherent to
choose between either following his religious beliefs or rejecting a generally available, nongeneric benefit).
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and not RLUIPA.138
Moreover, without a clearly stated antidiscriminatory purpose, courts will not extend CRREA to RLUIPA cases
because sovereign immunity is strictly construed in favor of the
sovereign.139 Therefore, CRREA’s catch-all provision fails to satisfy the
clear statement doctrine because the catch-all provision does not apply to
RLUIPA.140
B. Is RLUIPA Valid Under the Commerce Clause and Are Damages
Available?
For monetary relief in official capacity claims under RLUIPA, the Act
must meet the clear statement doctrine to eliminate Eleventh
Amendment immunity.141 Congress cannot abrogate a state’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity to create an official capacity suit under the
Commerce Clause, but Congress can create a private cause of action in
individual capacity suits using its commerce power.142 Before Congress
can do so, the regulation must be valid under the Commerce Clause, and
the legislation must fit into one of the three identified categories of
commerce.143 Of these categories, the one relevant to RLUIPA is
Congress’s ability to regulate activities that substantially affect
commerce.144 To determine if the regulated activity does so, the activity

138
See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any persons within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike”).
139
See generally Ohta v. Muraski, No. 3:93 CV 00554 (JAC), 1993 WL 366525, at *4–5 (D.
Conn. Aug. 19, 1993) (explaining that the broad and unspecific language of the catch-all
provision did not serve as an unequivocal textual waiver to anti-discriminatory statutes
outside of the four specifically enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2006)).
140
See supra note 84 (listing decisions that found the catch-all provision not to apply);
supra notes 129–139 and accompanying text (finding that RLUIPA’s discriminatory purpose
is ambiguous, thus, RLUIPA does not apply to CRREA because sovereign immunity is
construed in favor of the sovereign).
141
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing textual waivers).
142
See supra note 64 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress cannot use its
commerce power to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity).
143
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). Congress can regulate: (1)
channels of interstate commerce, (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3)
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. See also supra Part II.B.2
(discussing valid Commerce Clause legislation).
144
See supra note 36 (explaining that Congress can regulate channels of commerce or
instrumentalities of commerce under its commerce power). But see Charles v. Verhagen,
348 F.3d 601, 609 n.3 (7th Cir. 2003). The court noted that the Wisconsin Department of
Corrections sent approximately four thousand of its inmates to out-of-state facilities to
alleviate overcrowding. Id. “That fact, in our view, lends validity to RLUIPA’s
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.” Id. The Seventh Circuit implied the
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is analyzed under the four factors articulated in United States v.
Morrison.145
1.

Is RLUIPA Directed at Regulating Commercial or Economic
Activity?

If the activity at which the statute is directed is commercial or
economic in nature, a heavy presumption exists that Congress can
regulate the activity.146 Raich expanded the definition of commerce to
include the consumption of commodities as well as their production and
distribution.147 RLUIPA, however, regulates the substantial burden
created by the government on an incarcerated person’s free exercise of
religion.148 The regulated activity is the conduct of state actors, not the
consumption of commodities.149 Thus, RLUIPA is similar to GFSZA and
VAWA in that it does not regulate a “quintessentially economic” activity
even though, in certain occasions, the activity can have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.150 Concluding that RLUIPA does not
regulate commercial activity does not end the analysis; rather, this

transferred prisoners were instrumentalities of commerce, but declined to further discuss
the issue. See id.
145
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609–13 (2000). The Morrison factors are:
(1) is the activity the statute regulates economic or commercial in nature?, (2) does a
jurisdictional element exist?, (3) what are the congressional findings concerning the
regulated activity?, and (4) is the link between the prohibited conduct and substantial effect
on interstate commerce attenuated? Id. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text
(explaining the Morrison factors).
146
See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining the first inquiry in determining
whether Congress can regulate the activity in question is whether or not that activity is
economic).
147
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (defining economics as “the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities”) (internal quotations omitted). See Adler,
supra note 50, at 763 (noting that the expansive definition used by the Court in Raich easily
encompasses non-commercial, intrastate activity).
148
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2006). See also Charles, 348 F.3d at 609 n.3. In dicta the
Charles court stated that “[t]he [Wisconsin Department of Corrections] certainly engages in
interstate commerce to properly handle the requests for religious and other personal
property from inmates housed outside Wisconsin.” Id. The court did not discuss if the
DOC engaged in interstate commerce by handling requests for inmates housed in-state. Id.
149
See Daker v. Ferrero, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2007). The Daker court
found that RLUIPA prevented interference of religious activity by the government. Id.
Although the court hypothesized many situations in which the activity regulated by
RLUIPA could be commercial activity, the job of the court was to decide the issue in front
of them. Id. at 1345 n.10.
150
See supra note 42 (explaining the type of conduct prohibited by GFSZA and VAWA).
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finding channels the analysis to determine if the regulated activity
substantially affects interstate commerce.151
2.

Does the Activity RLUIPA Regulates Substantially Affect Interstate
Commerce?

By not directly regulating commercial activity, RLUIPA will, at
times, regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce,
while at others it will regulate non-commercial intrastate activities.152 In
this way, RLUIPA, GFSZA, and VAWA, are similar, sometimes
constitutional, sometimes not.153 Each Act needs a limiting factor to
remain constitutional, but the inclusion of a jurisdictional element does
not automatically extinguish all constitutional doubt as it must have an
explicit connection to interstate commerce.154 Among them, RLUIPA is
the only statute that possesses a sufficient jurisdictional element
restricting its application to conduct that substantially affects interstate
commerce while prohibiting it from applying to specific conduct that
does not.155 With a sufficiently restricting jurisdictional element,
RLUIPA will survive a facial constitutional challenge.156
The inclusion of a jurisdictional element lessens the need for specific
findings by allowing a case-by-case inquiry; however, Congress must
151
See United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 625 (10th Cir. 2006). See also Nathaniel
Stewart, Note, Turning the Commerce Clause Challenge “On its Face”: Why Federal Commerce
Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 161, 171–72 (2004)
(explaining that answering one of the Morrison factors in the negative does not end the
analysis); infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the activities regulated by RLUIPA and questioning
whether those activities substantially affect interstate commerce).
152
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). Without a comprehensive,
regulatory scheme, Congress cannot regulate a non-commercial intrastate activity. Id.
153
See Rotunda, supra note 45, at 800–02 (explaining that Lopez and Morrison simply held
that Congress cannot regulate intrastate activity that has no substantial effect on interstate
commerce).
154
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611–12. See Patton, 451 F.3d at 632 (stating that a jurisdictional
element is not “a talisman that wards off constitutional challenges”); Stewart, supra note
151, at 209–10 (arguing that satisfying the jurisdictional element guides courts to conduct
appropriate facial analysis); supra note 43 (discussing the requirements of a valid
jurisdictional element).
155
See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000cc-1(b)(2) (2006). RLUIPA applies through the Commerce Clause
only when “the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would
affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes.” Id.
Also, the government may challenge any claims made under the Commerce Clause by
arguing that the burden in question does not, in its aggregate substantially affect
commerce. Id. § 2000cc-2(g).
156
See Stewart, supra note 151, at 204–11. A facial challenge requires the challenged
statute to be constitutional in every situation and is much harsher than an as-applied
challenge. Id. at 205. See also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (stating that the Court
must determine if Congress had a rational belief).
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have a rational belief that the regulated activity substantially affects
interstate commerce.157
Courts give considerable deference to
congressional findings, but they are not a necessity and cannot
singlehandedly sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause
legislation.158 RLUIPA’s legislative history contains no congressional
findings; thus, the courts have no choice but to rely on the evidence
presented and employ a case-by-case approach.159
Determining whether there is an attenuated link between the
regulated activity and the substantial effect is the most critical step in the
analysis.160 Prisons routinely make large commercial transactions to
purchase food for inmates and accommodate specific religious diets
requiring additional food purchases.161
In addition, purchased
devotional items and literature likely cross state lines.162
Other
situations, such as requests for certain food preparations or requests for
possession of religious articles absent commercial transactions, will
likely not be covered.163 The situation is the same for claims concerning
See supra note 43 (discussing jurisdictional elements).
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614. The Morrison Court invalidated the Commerce Clause
section of VAWA despite the numerous congressional findings that violence against
women affects interstate commerce. Id. See also supra note 44 (explaining the importance of
congressional findings).
159
Guidry, supra note 36, at 436–38 (noting that the legislative history has numerous
findings concerning the land use provision of RLUIPA, but none related to institutionalized
persons). See also Patton, 451 F.3d at 630. Congressional findings facilitate a court’s inquiry
into the effects of the challenged activity on interstate commerce, as courts give
congressional findings substantial deference. Id
160
See Adler, supra note 50, at 760–61 (stating that the first and fourth Morrison factors
provided the “core” to the Morrison decision).
161
Gaubatz, supra note 39, at 537 n.150. Refusal to accommodate specific religious diets
restricts a number of transactions. Id. See Paige Dickerson, North Olympic Peninsula Jails,
Clallam Bay Prison Struggle with Soaring Food Prices, PENINSULA DAILY NEWS, July 5,
2008, http://www.peninsuladailynews.com/article/20080706/NEWS/807060306 (last
visited Aug. 19, 2009). For example, the Clallam Bay Correction Facility (WA) has an
annual food budget of $1.2 million with occupancy of eight hundred and fifty inmates. Id.
A county jail with about fifty inmates spends up to $67,000 on food annually, and a jail that
houses around one hundred and seventeen prisoners daily has an annual budget of
$160,000. Id.
162
See Gaubatz, supra note 39, at 537 n.151. See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
300–01 (1964) (admitting that the food purchased from out-of-state vendors would be
insignificant, but still allowed the Wickard test to be used); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d
601, 605 (7th Cir. 2003) (overturning the prohibition on possession of Islamic prayer oil);
Adams v. Mosley, No. 2:05cv352-MHT, 2008 WL 4369246, at *10–12 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 25,
2008) (Native American required the smoking of tobacco); Jones v. Rieben, No. 2:04cv1029MHT, 2008 WL 4080360, at *6–7 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 2, 2008) (requesting a religious feast).
163
See Marr v. Foy, No. 1:07-cv-908, 2008 WL 5111849, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2008)
(rejecting prisoner’s request to have his Kosher diet exclusively prepared in another room).
See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560–61 (1995) (rejecting the argument that the
possession of firearms substantially affects interstate commerce).
157
158
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grooming.164 For example, facial hair grooming is done individually
with purchased materials, but the effect of those purchased materials on
interstate commerce is likely attenuated.165 In situations such as these,
the court must “pile inference upon inference,” which is a task the Court
is unwilling to do.166
The jurisdictional element limits the applicability only to those
substantial burdens that affect interstate commerce.167 As a result,
RLUIPA is constitutional, but many claims will not substantially affect
interstate commerce.168 These same claims, however, might find
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause if the activity at issue is a larger,
comprehensive scheme created by RLUIPA.169
3.

Does RLUIPA Create a Comprehensive Economic Scheme?

RLUIPA can regulate non-commercial intrastate activities, if it
contains a comprehensive economic scheme.170 Compared to the CSA
that regulated drug trafficking in Raich and to the Agricultural
Adjustment Act (“AAA”) that regulated personal wheat production in
Wickard, RLUIPA lacks any comprehensive economic market.171 The
See Guidry, supra note 36, at 447 (explaining that claims for growing facial hair and
requirements for haircuts do not involve any commercial elements). See, e.g. Longoria v.
Dretke, 507 F.3d 898, 902–04 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding the prison’s grooming policy that
forced inmates to cut their hair to a certain length for safety purposes). In addition,
personal grooming claims under RLUIPA are rarely successful due to the substantial
deference given to prison officials when prison safety is the reason for the forced grooming.
Id.
165
See Guidry, supra note 36, at 446–47. The argument can be made, however, that
grooming materials substantially affect interstate commerce because prisoners continually
need supplies for grooming such as soap and safety razors. See id.
166
See supra note 45 (explaining that before Lopez, the Supreme Court was willing to
make multiple inferences to find a substantial effect). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16,
at 254 (noting that from 1937 to 1995 the Supreme Court did not find Congress exceeded its
commerce power).
167
See United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1218 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the
jurisdictional element must limit application, rather than be a meaningless insertion of
statutory language).
168
See generally Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (explaining that the Court would have found the
GFSZA constitutional if the statute contained a jurisdictional element that sufficiently
limited it under the Commerce Clause).
169
See infra Part III.B.3 (analyzing if RLUIPA established a comprehensive, regulatory
scheme).
170
See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005) (prohibiting the access of certain intrastate
articles is a common way to regulate commerce of that product). See also Parry, supra note
50, at 860. Through the inverse of the Raich holding, ensuring the access of certain
intrastate articles would also serve as a method to regulate commerce in that product. Id.
171
Compare Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005) (finding RLUIPA targeted
religious exercise by institutionalized persons), with Raich, 545 U.S. at 26 (“[T]he CSA is a
164

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/8

Rom: RLUIPA and Prisoner's Rights: Vindicating Liberty of Conscience

2009]

RLUIPA and Prisoner’s Rights

323

CSA prohibited the possession of marijuana as a means to regulate the
interstate distribution of the drug, and the AAA regulated intrastate
production of wheat as a means to increase consumer demand.172
RLUIPA’s regulated activity will, at times, negatively affect the supply
and demand of certain commodities, but RLUIPA is similar to SORNA
because it fails to establish a regulatory scheme with economic
qualities.173 Through SORNA, Congress created a national registry
requirement for sex offenders, but prosecuting sex offenders who fail to
register and fail to engage in intrastate travel is unconstitutional.174 The
regulated activity, sex offender registration, lacks economic qualities and
fails to create a nexus between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce.175
Ultimately, Congress cannot regulate non-commercial intrastate
activities under RLUIPA because it failed to establish a sufficiently
expansive economic regulatory scheme.176 As a result, the majority of
RLUIPA claims, especially those related to religious ceremony,
possession of religious materials, and grooming will not fall under

statute that directly regulates economic, commercial activity.”). The CSA makes “it
unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substance.” Raich,
545 U.S. at 13 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 844(a) (2006)).
172
See Adler, supra note 50, at 764 (explaining that so long as a statute defines the
regulated activity in broad economic terms, Congress has no limit in regulating noncommercial interstate activity through a comprehensive regulatory scheme).
173
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2006) (punishing a sex offender who travels interstate,
but not one who travels intrastate) and id. § 16913(a) (requiring a sex offender to register
where he or she resides), with id. § 2000cc-1(b) (prohibiting the government from imposing
substantial burdens on religious exercise of prisoners). See also United States v. Vardaro,
575 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1186 (D. Mont. 2008) (holding that a sex offender can never be a felon
under SORNA for conducting purely intrastate travel).
174
See 42 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (requiring sex offenders to register pursuant to the Commerce
Clause). See also Schuller, supra note 46, at 92–96 (outlining the requirements of SORNA);
supra note 46 (discussing court decisions that found Section 16913 of SORNA
unconstitutional absent interstate travel).
175
See United States v. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (holding that
the jurisdictional hook was insufficient because it failed to establish a nexus between the
crime and interstate commerce).
176
See Daker v. Ferrero, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1346–47 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (holding that
RLUIPA did not establish a comprehensive regulatory scheme of the sale of commercial
goods). See, e.g., Jones v. Rieben, No. 2:04cv1029-MHT, 2008 WL 4080360, at *6–7 (M.D.
Ala. Sept. 2, 2008) (denying the prisoner’s request for the use of music during religious
services); Muhammad v. Crosby, No. 4:05cv193-WS, 2008 WL 2229746, at *15–16 (N.D. Fla.
May 29, 2008) (denying prisoner’s request to wear Islamic clothing, permission not to tuck
his shirts into his pants, the use of a Qibla compass to determine which direction is Mecca,
and taking showers outside of the cell).
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Commerce Clause jurisdiction.177 If RLUIPA had defined its regulated
activity in broad, economic terms it might have been able to regulate
these activities with the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory
scheme.178
C. Should Damages Be Awarded to Inmates?
Prisoners’ rights are limited by their incarceration, but those limited
rights possessed by prisoners should be vigorously protected.179
Prisoners seeking monetary damages in any claim face a difficult task
before they enter the courtroom with PLRA limiting the availability of
damages for claims of mental and emotional distress absent physical
injury.180 In the prison context, however, the loss of the ability to
exercise one’s religion should be treated differently than mental or
emotional injury.181 A prisoner’s loss of the physical right to worship
should be compensated.182 Moreover, Congress passed PLRA to
eliminate frivolous lawsuits, not legitimate constitutional claims.183
Often prisoners bring free exercise or RLUIPA claims while
incarcerated, but by the time the claims are heard or the appeal is
answered, the prisoners have either been transferred to another
institution or released.184 If courts are unwilling to award monetary
damages, claims for injunctive or declaratory relief will be dismissed as
moot, leaving prisoners no remedy for the violation of their free exercise

177
See generally Guidry, supra note 36, at 446–47 (arguing that claims about growth of hair
and beards will not substantially affect interstate commerce, therefore such claims fall
outside of Congress’s commerce power).
178
See Adler, supra note 50, at 763–64 (explaining that so long as a statute defines the
regulated activity in broad economic terms, Congress has no limit in regulating noncommercial interstate activity through a comprehensive regulatory scheme).
179
See generally Armijo, supra note 29, at 299–303 (explaining that allowing prisoners
freedom for religious practice benefits the individual prisoner and society at large).
180
See 42. U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006). In addition, PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust all
administrative remedies before filing a claim. Id. § 1997e(a).
181
See supra note 52 (discussing how the loss of religious exercise is different than a
mental or emotional injury).
182
Larson, supra note 29, at 1470 (arguing that courts possess the ability to convert the
physical loss of religious exercise into monetary relief).
183
Id. at 1469 (arguing that PLRA prevents courts from awarding outrageous damages in
successful RLUIPA claims).
184
See El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 252 (D. Conn. 2008)
(requesting only monetary relief because he was no longer incarcerated). But see Bredehoft,
supra note 68, at 169–70 (arguing that allowing prisoners to seek claims of monetary relief
frustrates the purpose of RLUIPA). The intent of RLUIPA is to protect free exercise rights,
but prisoners who sue their former institution after release or transfer will use RLUIPA to
collect money and not as a method to protect religious practice. Id.
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rights.185 Similar to PLRA, release or transfer “would make RLUIPA’s
text inoperative . . . . Prisoners would lack a remedy under RLUIPA even
though the violation of their rights was established and even where it
comes close to shocking the conscience.”186 It seems unlikely that
Congress would create a right that could, in many instances, be violated
for extended periods and possibly have no remedy.187
Compared to society at large, free exercise rights are likely more
meaningful to prisoners.188 In the controlled prison environment,

See Neal v. Lucas, 75 F. App’x 960, 961 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that prisoner’s RLUIPA
claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for use of religious publications were moot
after the prisoner was transferred out of the facility, but that claims for monetary relief
remained); Magee v. Keim, No. 05-087-GPM, 2008 WL 1902033, at *1–*2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 28,
2008) (holding that claims for equitable relief were moot after plaintiff was transferred from
the facility); Santiago v. Sherman, No. 05-153 Erie, 2007 WL 217353, at *3 (W.D. Pa. 2007)
(“In the prison context, the transfer of an inmate from the facility complained of moots
claims for injunctive relief involving that facility.”).
186
Larson, supra note 29, at 1471. Even if their claims are heard while incarcerated,
injunctive relief fails to provide an adequate remedy if recurrence of the harm is unlikely.
Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(e) (2006). A RLUIPA claim can be rendered moot by the “safe
harbor” provision if a change by the penal institution eliminates the burden on religious
exercise:
[G]overnment may avoid the preemptive force of any provision of this
chapter by changing the policy or practice that results in a substantial
burden on religious exercise, by retaining the policy or practice and
exempting the substantially burdened religious exercise, by providing
exemptions from the policy or practice for applications that
substantially burden religious exercise, or by any other means that
eliminates the substantial burden.
Id. See also Boles v. Neet, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1241 (D. Colo. 2005) (explaining that the
prisoner’s damage before the correctional facility changed its policy towards wearing
religious garb during outside transports was not pertinent because the safe harbor
provision in RLUIPA preempted liability).
187
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (stating that RLUIPA should be construed to broadly
protect religious exercise). See also Pugh v. Goord, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477, 488–90 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (holding that release from the correctional facility rendered injunctive and
declaratory relief moot). In Pugh, the court also heard RLUIPA and First Amendment
claims of two prisoners, Pugh and Catlin, who were later released. Id at 484. The two
inmates were Shi’ia Muslims and requested to have their religious ceremonies separate
from Sunni Muslims. Id. at 485. Pugh claimed the Fishkill Correctional Facility violated
RLUIPA by denying his request, however, the court heard his claims when he was housed
at another facility. Id. at 484. The court held Pugh’s claims were not moot because the
RLUIPA violation was “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” because the state could
freely transfer Pugh between facilities prior to litigation. Id. at 489. See also Puerto Rico
Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (holding the
Eleventh Amendment only allows for prospective relief). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment
bars courts from issuing declaratory relief against state officials who violated federal law in
the past. Id.
188
See generally Armijo, supra note 29, at 301–02 (arguing that free exercise rights serve
greater personal importance to prisoners compared to those outside of prison).
185
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religious exercise is the only aspect of prison life in which prisoners feel
ownership, and it may serve as their path to salvation as they
recompense for the crimes they have committed.189 Considering the
importance of religious exercise, prisoners deserve monetary
compensation when the government burdens their religious exercise if
awarding damages is found appropriate by the sitting court.190
Ultimately, monetary relief further insulates prisoners from arbitrary
regulations burdening religious exercise.191 The approaches employed
by the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits failed to consider the full statutory
text of RLUIPA.192 Both circuits agreed “appropriate relief” can include
monetary relief, but each incorrectly addressed the ambiguity.193
Further, RLUIPA in its current form possesses limited applicability
under the Commerce Clause because so few claims can substantially
affect interstate commerce.194 Many claims will fall outside of Commerce
Clause jurisdiction unless Congress amends RLUIPA.195 Below, Part IV
offers a resolution to the circuit split and an expansion of Commerce
Clause jurisdiction.196
IV. CONTRIBUTION
RLUIPA protects a prisoner’s ability to exercise his or her religion to
its “maximum extent.”197 When a prisoner loses this right, the injury is
the loss of religious exercise that can be remedied by compensatory
damages.198 Courts award punitive damages when defendants act with
malice or if the award would deter future unlawful conduct.199 When no
cognizable loss is found, prisoners can still be awarded nominal
damages in situations when prison officials refuse to serve religious diets

See generally id. See also id. at 302 n.26 (noting that President George W. Bush
rigorously supported faith-based initiatives to facilitate religious rehabilitation).
190
See Bredehoft, supra note 68, at 168 (noting that without awarding damages, prison
officials lack incentive to protect free exercise rights inside the penal institution). See also
infra Part IV (proposing how monetary relief can be available to prisoners).
191
See supra Part III.C (arguing monetary relief fully compensates free exercise injury).
192
See supra Part III.A (analyzing decisions from the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits).
193
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the decisions from the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits).
194
See supra Part III.B (analyzing RLUIPA under the Commerce Clause).
195
See supra Part III.B.3 (explaining many RLUIPA claims cannot invoke the Commerce
Clause).
196
See infra Part IV.A (proposing judicial interpretation).
197
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2006).
198
See supra Part III.C (arguing that prisoners suffer physical injury from the loss of
religious exercise).
199
Larson, supra note 29, at 1471 (noting that prisoners have a very high burden to
support an award of punitive damages).
189
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or force grooming that is inconsistent with religious tenets.200 This Note
proposes that damages are available in all official capacity claims.201
To determine the availability of monetary relief, courts should
interpret “appropriate relief” using RLUIPA Section 2000cc-3(g), which
mandates the protection of free exercise to the “maximum extent” of its
terms.202 In analyzing “appropriate relief,” courts have no difficulty
determining that it encompasses monetary relief, but balk at awarding
damages due to Eleventh Amendment concerns.203
Reading the
statutory terms broadly removes the ambiguity of “appropriate relief”
by leaving only one reasonable and plausible interpretation.204 Thus,
RLUIPA expressly conditions the acceptance of federal funds on the
state’s consent to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity to monetary
damages.
Moreover, a broad interpretation of “appropriate relief” to include
monetary damages is not radical or beyond a fair reading of the
statute.205 Nor will interpreting “appropriate relief” to include damages
obligate the state to pay prisoners in every successful RLUIPA claim
because the term “appropriate” allows the court discretion to award
monetary relief.206 Moreover, only a few prisoners are successful in their
RLUIPA claims, and out of that small group, even fewer present claims
that warrant monetary relief.207 For instance, monetary relief is proper
when the prisoners are transferred or released after bringing the claim.208
In addition, monetary damages are proper in claims that present a
scenario where the religious burden was the result of willful or wanton
conduct aimed at bullying the prisoner or was done in retaliation.209
PLRA further shields the State from large damage awards by barring

Id. at 1467 (stating that courts award nominal damages for violations of rights that do
not cause harm).
201
See infra Part IV.A (proposing judicial interpretation).
202
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g); supra Part III.A.1 (analyzing Section 2000cc-3(g) in
conjunction with the phrase “appropriate relief”).
203
See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining that courts readily identified that “appropriate relief”
could include monetary damages).
204
See supra note 147 (discussing the definition of “maximum” to include “an upper limit
allowed” and “the greatest quantity”).
205
See 146 CONG. REC. E1563 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady)
(discussing the statutory language of RLUIPA).
206
See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983) (defining “appropriate”).
207
146 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy).
208
See supra Part III.C (explaining that many courts dismiss RLUIPA claims as moot if the
prisoner who brought the claim was released or transferred to another prison).
209
See Larson, supra note 29, at 1467–68.
200
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prisoners from bringing damage claims without physical injury.210
Awarding monetary relief will not result in excessive payouts to
prisoners, but will work towards the purpose of RLUIPA—to protect
prisoners’ free exercise rights to the “maximum extent.”
V. CONCLUSION
A decade after Employment Division v. Smith, Congress finally
developed a successful model to vigorously protect free exercise
rights.211 Establishing the strict scrutiny standard of review through
congressional spending and commerce powers has numerous
applications outside of the prison context. But it is telling that Congress
chose to protect the free exercise rights of prisoners first. It demonstrates
Congress’s passion to protect those in the most vulnerable positions.
Sometimes, however, Congress leaves a few loose ends, forcing those
seeking protection to rely on their own creativity.
With damages available, the hypothetical that began this Note ends
with justice served.212 Awarding monetary relief prevents the South
Greenwich State Prison from easily escaping liability, while fully
compensating the prisoner for injuries related to the free exercise loss.213
Protecting prisoners’ free exercise rights to the maximum extent is
achieved by interpreting “appropriate relief” to include monetary
relief.214 When a state accepts federal funding and subjects itself to
RLUIPA’s terms, no other reasonable interpretation of “appropriate
relief” exists. With states consenting to suit for monetary relief,
prisoners deserve damages when the court deems them appropriate. As
the Supreme Court stated in Turner v. Safley, “Prison walls do not form a
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the
Constitution.”215 Allowing monetary damages helps hurdle that barrier.
Gary R. Rom*
210
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006). See supra note 52 (explaining how PLRA applies to
RLUIPA).
211
See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that neutral laws
of general applicability do not need to satisfy strict scrutiny review).
212
See supra Part I (presenting a hypothetical illustrating the injustices of not awarding
monetary relief in RLUIPA claims).
213
See supra Part I.
214
See supra Part IV.A.
215
482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
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